Moheeb Zara
f5d670477b
Full-application audit (5 parallel read-only audits). Two agent
"blockers" were false alarms and verified as already-correct. Real
findings fixed:
- Self-escalation (BLOCKER): migration 024 + schema.sql section 16
extend prevent_member_self_role_change to also block a
non-privileged member changing their own tier_id (self tier
upgrade) and onboarding_completed_at (skipping required
code-of-conduct via a raw PostgREST call). finishOnboarding and
skipOnboarding now set onboarding_completed_at through the service
client AFTER their server-side required-steps check, so the
legitimate path is unaffected.
- Cross-tenant write scoping: added .eq('space_id', member.space_id)
to updateForumThread, deleteForumThread, editComment, deleteComment,
deleteChannel, renameChannel (RLS-only -> defence-in-depth).
- generateInviteCode: crypto.getRandomValues, widened to 8 chars
(was Math.random, ~21 bits, enumerable under the join rate limit).
- SafeMarkdown: dropped iframe and the global style attribute
(no unsandboxed embeds / UI-redress); markdown + safe HTML stay.
- /settings: server-side admin redirect before fetching space and
integration config (was client-hidden only).
- app/(app)/layout.tsx: export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic'.
- Bounded queries: loadComments .limit(500), tasks .limit(2000).
Backlog from the audit is tracked in HANDOFF (import Zod schemas,
types/database.ts + docs regen, email lowercasing, unauthorized-
handling consistency, KB-modal ACL hookup).
271/271 tests pass. Build clean. Migrations 023 + 024 idempotent,
apply via deploy.sh on next deploy.
41 lines
1.4 KiB
TypeScript
41 lines
1.4 KiB
TypeScript
'use client'
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import ReactMarkdown from 'react-markdown'
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import remarkGfm from 'remark-gfm'
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import rehypeRaw from 'rehype-raw'
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import rehypeSanitize, { defaultSchema } from 'rehype-sanitize'
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// Renders admin-authored markdown that MAY contain a constrained subset of raw
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// HTML. rehype-raw parses the HTML; rehype-sanitize then strips anything
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// dangerous. The author is a space admin/board member, but a stored-XSS or
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// UI-redress payload would still run in other members' sessions within that
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// tenant, so this is sanitized hard, not trusted:
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// - no `iframe` (no unsandboxed third-party embeds / token theft frame)
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// - no global `style` attribute (no full-viewport overlay redress)
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// - links forced to safe protocols; rel/target locked down
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const schema = {
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...defaultSchema,
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attributes: {
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...defaultSchema.attributes,
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'*': [...(defaultSchema.attributes?.['*'] ?? []), 'className'],
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a: [...(defaultSchema.attributes?.a ?? []), 'target', 'rel'],
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},
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protocols: {
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...defaultSchema.protocols,
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href: ['https', 'http', 'mailto'],
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},
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}
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export function SafeMarkdown({ children, className }: { children: string; className?: string }) {
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return (
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<div className={`prose prose-sm prose-neutral dark:prose-invert max-w-none break-words ${className ?? ''}`}>
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<ReactMarkdown
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remarkPlugins={[remarkGfm]}
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rehypePlugins={[rehypeRaw, [rehypeSanitize, schema]]}
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>
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{children}
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</ReactMarkdown>
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</div>
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)
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}
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