Files
hackerspace.sh/scripts/024_self_change_hardening.sql
Moheeb Zara f5d670477b fix(security): close member self-escalation + harden after full audit
Full-application audit (5 parallel read-only audits). Two agent
"blockers" were false alarms and verified as already-correct. Real
findings fixed:

- Self-escalation (BLOCKER): migration 024 + schema.sql section 16
  extend prevent_member_self_role_change to also block a
  non-privileged member changing their own tier_id (self tier
  upgrade) and onboarding_completed_at (skipping required
  code-of-conduct via a raw PostgREST call). finishOnboarding and
  skipOnboarding now set onboarding_completed_at through the service
  client AFTER their server-side required-steps check, so the
  legitimate path is unaffected.
- Cross-tenant write scoping: added .eq('space_id', member.space_id)
  to updateForumThread, deleteForumThread, editComment, deleteComment,
  deleteChannel, renameChannel (RLS-only -> defence-in-depth).
- generateInviteCode: crypto.getRandomValues, widened to 8 chars
  (was Math.random, ~21 bits, enumerable under the join rate limit).
- SafeMarkdown: dropped iframe and the global style attribute
  (no unsandboxed embeds / UI-redress); markdown + safe HTML stay.
- /settings: server-side admin redirect before fetching space and
  integration config (was client-hidden only).
- app/(app)/layout.tsx: export const dynamic = 'force-dynamic'.
- Bounded queries: loadComments .limit(500), tasks .limit(2000).

Backlog from the audit is tracked in HANDOFF (import Zod schemas,
types/database.ts + docs regen, email lowercasing, unauthorized-
handling consistency, KB-modal ACL hookup).

271/271 tests pass. Build clean. Migrations 023 + 024 idempotent,
apply via deploy.sh on next deploy.
2026-05-15 17:35:11 -07:00

62 lines
2.5 KiB
PL/PgSQL

-- =============================================================================
-- 024: Close member self-escalation gaps in prevent_member_self_role_change
-- =============================================================================
-- The members_update RLS policy intentionally lets a member update their own
-- row (display_name, handle, bio, skills, ...). The 015 trigger blocks the
-- privileged columns, but two columns added by later migrations were not in
-- its list:
--
-- tier_id (021) - a member could self-upgrade their tier
-- onboarding_completed_at (022) - a member could skip required onboarding
-- (e.g. the code-of-conduct acknowledgement)
-- by setting this directly via PostgREST
--
-- finishOnboarding()/skipOnboarding() now set onboarding_completed_at through
-- the service-role client AFTER server-side validation, so blocking it here
-- does not break the legitimate path.
-- =============================================================================
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.prevent_member_self_role_change()
RETURNS trigger
LANGUAGE plpgsql SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = public
AS $$
DECLARE
v_is_privileged boolean;
BEGIN
IF auth.uid() IS NULL THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
IF NEW.user_id IS DISTINCT FROM auth.uid() THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
SELECT public.user_has_role_in_space(auth.uid(), NEW.space_id, ARRAY['admin','board','treasurer'])
INTO v_is_privileged;
IF v_is_privileged THEN
RETURN NEW;
END IF;
IF NEW.role IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.role
OR NEW.tier IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.tier
OR NEW.tier_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.tier_id
OR NEW.status IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.status
OR NEW.approved IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.approved
OR NEW.has_card_access IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.has_card_access
OR NEW.onboarding_completed_at IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.onboarding_completed_at
OR NEW.space_id IS DISTINCT FROM OLD.space_id THEN
RAISE EXCEPTION 'Members cannot change their own role, tier, status, approval, card access, onboarding completion, or space.'
USING ERRCODE = '42501';
END IF;
RETURN NEW;
END;
$$;
DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS trg_prevent_member_self_role_change ON public.space_members;
CREATE TRIGGER trg_prevent_member_self_role_change
BEFORE UPDATE ON public.space_members
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION public.prevent_member_self_role_change();