In-app notification center (Phase 5, migration 051):
- notifications.read_at + partial unread index. /me Notifications is now
an inbox: unread styling, click to expand the message + mark read,
"mark all as read", unread count. markNotificationsRead is a service-
client write scoped to the caller's own member_id. Always-on channel:
email-muted ('skipped') notifications still appear in-app.
Consolidate /profile into /me:
- Delete app/(app)/profile/*; /me is the single member page. Port the
conflict-of-interest privileged-role nudge + last-disclosed date into
/me's profile editor. Remove the "My profile" sidebar + command-palette
entries; rename the /me nav label to "My membership". Repoint the
recruitment empty-state link to /me.
Theme realign:
- Revert the rounded-lg cards introduced in the prior /me visual pass to
rounded (the app norm, matching the former /profile). Route /me section
headers through the SectionTitle primitive.
Regression guard:
- integration/auth-embed.test.ts runs the auth layout's
space_members.select('*, spaces(*)') embed through PostgREST and fails
on PGRST201, so a future junction table cannot silently break auth again.
The url renders to members as a clickable href. https was enforced only
in the admin Zod action, but RLS lets an admin/board write the row
directly via PostgREST, bypassing Zod, with no DB constraint -- a
malicious admin could store a javascript: URL and XSS members who click.
- Migration 050: CHECK (url ~* '^https://') so the DB is the source of
truth; integration-tested that the service path cannot store
javascript:/http:.
- Member-read action filters with isSafeDuesUrl (defense-in-depth).
- dues_payment_methods RLS: member read, admin-only write, cross-space
denial, 046 unverified-admin status gate (4 cases).
- notification dispatcher: a muted category becomes 'skipped' while
billing always sends; no pref row sends (default on). First real
exercise of the skip path (cron is gated off in prod).
- Fix integration/db.ts rowsAsUser: the SELECT must be the last psql -c
statement or its output is swallowed (it was never used before).
- Dues card: hide "No active dues subscription" for spaces without
Stripe, where it read as confusing.
Notification preferences (migration 048):
- Per-member opt-out of muteable categories (bookings, classes, forms,
admin alerts); billing is always-on. Opt-out model, default on.
- Dispatcher reads prefs and marks muted outbox rows 'skipped' instead
of sending; pure isMuted logic, fail-open on a prefs lookup error.
- notification_preferences table (default-deny RLS); /me toggles and
self-view via validated service-client actions.
Alternate dues payment methods (migration 049):
- Admin sets external pay-here URLs per platform (PayPal/Zeffy/Venmo)
in /settings; members see active ones on /me and pay off-platform;
the treasurer reconciles manually (platform pre-tagged). https-only.
- dues_payment_methods table (SELECT space member, write admin/board).
/me visual pass:
- Restore the chip/preset profile editor (skills/interests/willing-to/
affiliations); promote ChipInput and presets to shared modules.
- Gate the Stripe pay-dues button on whether the space has Stripe
configured; show external links or a contact-admin note otherwise.
Adds a session-closeout subsection capturing the three-audit-pass
discipline that this phase set as a new high-bar (each repeat audit
on the "clean" change set found a real, deploy-blocking issue: the
RPC enumeration vector, the best-effort gap in helpers, the phishing
vector in user-controlled fields exposed by form_submission_admin).
Refreshes the remaining-work list to the post-Phase 4 priority. The
owner-gated end-to-end validation is still the single biggest gap.
Member preferences + in-app inbox are now the natural next product
work (Phase 5; preferences also doubles as the volume governor for
Phase 4 fan-outs). user_has_permission EXECUTE-TO-PUBLIC pre-existing
exposure recorded as a separate triage item with the constraint
written down (RLS policies depend on anon/authenticated EXECUTE, so
the lockdown can't just be copied from migration 047).
Marks the Phase 4 entry DEPLOYED. Deploy log confirms migration 047
applied (applying 047_members_with_permission.sql, REVOKE, GRANT).
Smoke clean: public 200, gated 307, Stripe webhook 400, cron 503 (no
regressions; cron-503 is the expected fails-safe with CRON_SECRET
unset). The new event types are wired but inert at the transport
layer until owner provisions Resend and the cron secret + crontab.
Renames the P4f entry to "first-audit fixes", adds a P4g entry for the
third-audit URL-strip defense, and bumps the test-count line to 572
(40 new cases). The commit list at the top of the section now ends at
09f293e.
DATABASE_SCHEMA: the migration 047 row now records the REVOKE/GRANT
lockdown, with one-line rationale for why it differs from
user_has_permission (RLS policies depend on anon/authenticated being
able to call user_has_permission, so locking it would break policy
evaluation; the new function has no such constraint).
HANDOFF: replaces "Next-most-leverage" with "Highest-priority" in my
pass-56 backlog header. "Leverage" is on the CLAUDE.md style-bans list.
Records the ultrathink audit and the P4f fixes (RPC lockdown + best-
effort enqueue wraps). Also flags pre-existing user_has_permission
EXECUTE TO PUBLIC for separate triage: narrower than the 047 case
(per-uid boolean, only useful within spaces the caller is in), and
locking it down requires careful work because RLS policies depend on
anon/authenticated being able to call it. Out of Phase 4 scope.
Updates the test-count line to 567 (35 new cases) covering the new
helper best-effort no-throw paths.
Adds an ARCHITECTURE section "Notification breadth: bookings, classes,
forms" describing each new event type, the triggering action, the
recipient rule, and the dedupe-key scheme. Updates Known Limitations #5
to reflect that booking + class + form notifications are no longer "not
wired yet."
API_REFERENCE: extends the Transactional notifications section with the
shared enqueue helper, every new event type, its trigger and recipient,
and the new members_with_permission RPC used for the forms.manage
fan-out.
DATABASE_SCHEMA + DB_SCHEMA_MAP: adds the migration 047 row and the new
helper function to the helper-functions list.
HANDOFF: pass-56 entry covers the four locked design forks, the four
sub-phase commits, test growth (532 -> 565, +33 cases), state (local,
inert post-deploy until owner provisions Resend + CRON_SECRET), the
known fan-out volume tradeoff, and the remaining backlog.
Root-cause fix for 'correctness depended on post-deploy manual audits'.
Separate psql-driven suite (pnpm test:integration, own vitest config,
integration/ outside __tests__ so the hermetic pnpm test gate is
untouched; self-skips without a DB). 18 tests run against real Postgres:
- 045 class_signup_tx/class_cancel_tx: RETURNS TABLE->array shape the
actions destructure, capacity/waitlist/dedupe, and the per-session
advisory lock under TWO concurrent connections (D11 proven, never
over-enrolls).
- 042 equipment exclusion constraint (overlap 23P01; cancelled/adjacent
ok). 044 self-change trigger (role + payment cols blocked; service
bypass). 043 members_update WITH CHECK (cross-space move blocked).
Disproves the pass-52 flagged risk (signup rpc-shape). Non-runtime;
default pnpm test still 532/26 hermetic; build clean.
Deferred deeper-audit P1. signUpForClass (count->decide->insert) and
cancelMySignup (cancel->recount->promote) were non-atomic: concurrent
signups at the capacity boundary over-enrolled and concurrent cancels
double-promoted waitlisters (dynamic capacity can't be a DB constraint).
Migration 045 adds class_signup_tx/class_cancel_tx (SECURITY DEFINER,
pg_advisory_xact_lock per session) doing the decision+write atomically;
actions call the RPCs and keep all pre-checks. Removed the now-unused
effectiveCapacity/computeSignupStatus/pickPromotion imports +
isUniqueViolation (pure rules still live + tested in classes-logic).
528 tests; build clean.
prevent_member_self_role_change covered role/status/space but not the
financial columns; RLS members_update lets a member UPDATE their own
row, so payment_status/dues_paid_until/last_paid_at/last_payment_at/
stripe_customer_id/payment_note/joined_at were self-settable via
PostgREST to forge a dues-good signal. Migration 044 adds them to the
blocked set; service-client (auth.uid() NULL) + privileged-on-another-
member writes still bypass (Stripe webhook unaffected). Schema + maps.
UPDATE policy was USING-only: a privileged caller could mutate a member
row into a space they don't administer (no post-image re-check).
Migration 043 adds the mirrored WITH CHECK. Self column escalation
(space_id/role/status) remains blocked by the trigger (D9). Schema +
DB maps updated.
reserveEquipment was check-then-insert with no DB guard: two concurrent
requests both passed the in-memory overlap check and double-booked a
machine. Migration 042 adds btree_gist + a GiST EXCLUDE constraint
(equipment_id =, tstzrange && ) WHERE status='reserved', making the DB
the arbiter; the action maps the 23P01 violation to the existing
friendly overlap message. App-side check kept as a fast pre-check.
Schema + DB maps updated.
New getMyPayments: payments SELECT is treasurer-scoped (RLS), so the
self-view uses the validated service client strictly scoped to the
caller's space_id + member_id (same convention as getMyBilling /
getMyNotifications). Read-only list (amount, date, platform, status)
in the Membership tab. Docs updated. 521 tests; build clean.
PayPal client_secret (and any secret-named integration field) was stored
plaintext in integrations.config, unlike Stripe/door which use the
AES-256-GCM vault. A DB read or backup leaked it in cleartext.
- lib/secrets/vault.ts: canonical generic storeSecret/readSecret +
isSecretConfigField (the proven Stripe vault logic, generalized).
- saveIntegration: secret-named fields go to the vault, only a *_ref is
kept in config; blank submit preserves the ref (write-only like
Stripe); legacy plaintext auto-migrates into the vault on next save.
- paypal/sync reads client_secret from the vault, transitional fallback
to legacy plaintext until the next save.
- Docs updated (API_REFERENCE, ARCHITECTURE 10.3). 502 tests.
Independent audit verdict was NOT SAFE; all findings fixed:
- dispatcher Idempotency-Key is now per-attempt (${id}:${attempts}),
not row id alone, so a transient-failure response cached by Resend
cannot permanently suppress every retry and silently lose an email.
- enqueueDues is fully try/catch wrapped so a notifications-table or
render failure can never throw into / wedge the Stripe money path.
- dues_lapsed dedupe falls back to the subscription id when periodEnd
is null (canceled/deleted subs), so future lapses no longer collapse
to one key and get suppressed. New test; suite 499.
- documented the dispatcher's once/min concurrency assumption.
Migration 040 (mirrored in schema.sql Section 25 + the CREATE TYPE
list): ALTER TYPE payment_platform ADD VALUE 'stripe' (only safe path;
not used as a literal in the same migration); member_billing (member<->
Stripe customer/subscription/status/period; RLS SELECT = admin/board/
treasurer, NO client write policy — webhook/service-client only);
stripe_webhook_events idempotency ledger (PK = Stripe event id, service-
only, no policy). Per-space OWN keys: secrets->vault, config->
integrations.config. types + DATABASE_SCHEMA + DB_SCHEMA_MAP.
Moheeb Zara