Mobile responsiveness: several flex rows had a `truncate` child without
`min-w-0`, so a long value (member/door name, channel name, published form
URL) would not shrink and pushed the row past the viewport on a phone. Added
`min-w-0` (with `flex-1`/`shrink-0` where needed) on the dashboard presence +
door-self-entry rows, the comms channel list, and the form-builder URL.
Door inbound poll: `/api/cron/door-ingest` now polls connections with
Promise.allSettled instead of a sequential loop, so one tick is bounded to the
slowest single poll rather than the sum of all per-call timeouts; each
connection stays isolated and the run is idempotent.
Docs: refreshed ARCHITECTURE (door epic marked complete P1-P5), the README
access-control feature bullet + project-status pointer, a historical banner on
the older AUDIT.md, a door-epic CHANGELOG entry, and the rolling HANDOFF audit
log (passes 65-68). No migration; no behavior change for existing users.
The inbound-ingest matcher read a stored card_uid as both decimal and hex,
which mis-attributed all-digit uids (a stored "16" is hex 0x16 = 22, but it
wrongly matched a decimal poll of card 16) and was conceptually wrong.
HeatSync stores the uid as hex (the grant encoder requires it) and the ?z
log / webhooks report the decimal card number, so cardMatchesEvent now
matches a reported decimal when hexInt(storedUid) equals it, and matches a
webhook card_uid by exact string. This removes the false positive while
keeping every legit match. Attribution is audit-only (never an access
decision) and inert until a space enables ingest; no migration.
Also records the pass-63/64 door-epic deploy state and the pass-65 audit in
the handoff log.
Phase 4 (migration 053): pull entry/denied events into door_access_log and
match each card to a member, via two transports sharing one ingest core.
Poll: a CRON_SECRET-guarded /api/cron/door-ingest reads each opted-in
native-HeatSync connection's ?z log through the existing hardened executor
and parses it (firmware-characterized, best-effort ring buffer). Webhook:
/api/door/inbound/[connection] accepts pushed event JSON authenticated by a
per-connection bearer secret from the vault. Both dedupe on
(connection_id, dedupe_key) so re-polls and retries are no-ops. Adds an
inbound config panel to /door/manage.
Phase 5 (migration 054): admins define api_buttons that fire a configured
HTTP call (full verbs + headers + body) when an authorized member presses
them, through the same hardened egress (now shared between callDoor and the
new callApi). Each button carries a required_permission (default the new
apicall.invoke code); members see only buttons they may press. Builder at
/door/buttons with a door-template preset; members press from /doors. Every
press is recorded in api_call_log with secrets redacted.
Both subsystems are inert until an admin enables inbound on a connection or
creates a button. 624 unit + 50 integration tests; migrations applied
top-to-bottom in schema.sql; types and docs updated.
Diversified audit across public/API, XSS/rendering, and legacy authz
surfaces (three independent reviews). No P0. Fixes:
- Onboarding payment_url (P1 stored XSS): rendered into an href with no
protocol check; an admin could store javascript:. Sanitize at the sink
with sanitizeUrl (http(s) only). Same class as the dues-url fix.
- forum.addComment (P2): only forum_thread targets were space-verified;
proposal/incident/policy entity_ids were not, so a member could attach
a comment to another space's entity. Verify the target exists in the
caller's space (RLS-scoped) for every entity type before insert.
- joinSpace (P2): add a per-user rate limit (10/hr) for parity with
createSpace/signIn, bounding invite-code guessing.
Deep audit of the recent change set (passes 56-60):
- Remove the generic Integrations-tab Stripe card. saveIntegration
overwrites integrations.config wholesale, so configuring Stripe there
clobbered the dues config (mode/prices/grace_days) that the Dues tab
manages, and couldn't actually set up dues. Stripe is now configured in
one place (the Dues tab). PayPal/Zeffy/Venmo sync cards unchanged.
- deleteDuesPaymentMethod validates platform against DUES_LINK_PLATFORMS
instead of passing a raw client string into the enum column.
- markNotificationsRead uses a strict uuid regex for the id filter.
PGRST201 class characterized + confirmed contained: PostgREST treats a
2-FK table as an ambiguous junction only when its PK covers both FKs; the
only such table now is space_member_custom_roles (a legitimate M2M).
Guarded by integration/auth-embed.test.ts.
The Stripe recurring-dues panel and the external payment-links panel were
rendered below the settings tab bar (outside SettingsClient), so they
floated under every tab. Add a Dues tab (Space / Integrations / Dues /
Webhooks) and render both panels there as standard tab cards. UI only.
In-app notification center (Phase 5, migration 051):
- notifications.read_at + partial unread index. /me Notifications is now
an inbox: unread styling, click to expand the message + mark read,
"mark all as read", unread count. markNotificationsRead is a service-
client write scoped to the caller's own member_id. Always-on channel:
email-muted ('skipped') notifications still appear in-app.
Consolidate /profile into /me:
- Delete app/(app)/profile/*; /me is the single member page. Port the
conflict-of-interest privileged-role nudge + last-disclosed date into
/me's profile editor. Remove the "My profile" sidebar + command-palette
entries; rename the /me nav label to "My membership". Repoint the
recruitment empty-state link to /me.
Theme realign:
- Revert the rounded-lg cards introduced in the prior /me visual pass to
rounded (the app norm, matching the former /profile). Route /me section
headers through the SectionTitle primitive.
Regression guard:
- integration/auth-embed.test.ts runs the auth layout's
space_members.select('*, spaces(*)') embed through PostgREST and fails
on PGRST201, so a future junction table cannot silently break auth again.
notification_preferences (048) had FKs to BOTH space_members and spaces.
PostgREST read that as a junction, so embedding spaces into space_members
(the auth layout's `select('*, spaces(*)')`) became ambiguous and errored
-- member resolved to null and every logged-in user was bounced to /signup.
Drop the redundant space_id -> spaces FK (space is reachable via
member_id -> space_members; space deletion still cascades through it). With
one FK left the table is no longer a junction and the embed is unambiguous.
Verified against local PostgREST: the embed returns rows again.
(schema.sql also carries the in-progress notifications.read_at column from
uncommitted inbox work; harmless -- prod applies migrations, not schema.sql.)
Edge URLs like https:example.com parse to protocol https: but lack //,
which the migration-050 CHECK rejects -- the admin would see a confusing
save failure instead of a clear validation error. Require the prefix so
the Zod boundary matches the data layer. Fail-closed either way; no
security impact.
The url renders to members as a clickable href. https was enforced only
in the admin Zod action, but RLS lets an admin/board write the row
directly via PostgREST, bypassing Zod, with no DB constraint -- a
malicious admin could store a javascript: URL and XSS members who click.
- Migration 050: CHECK (url ~* '^https://') so the DB is the source of
truth; integration-tested that the service path cannot store
javascript:/http:.
- Member-read action filters with isSafeDuesUrl (defense-in-depth).
- dues_payment_methods RLS: member read, admin-only write, cross-space
denial, 046 unverified-admin status gate (4 cases).
- notification dispatcher: a muted category becomes 'skipped' while
billing always sends; no pref row sends (default on). First real
exercise of the skip path (cron is gated off in prod).
- Fix integration/db.ts rowsAsUser: the SELECT must be the last psql -c
statement or its output is swallowed (it was never used before).
- Dues card: hide "No active dues subscription" for spaces without
Stripe, where it read as confusing.
Notification preferences (migration 048):
- Per-member opt-out of muteable categories (bookings, classes, forms,
admin alerts); billing is always-on. Opt-out model, default on.
- Dispatcher reads prefs and marks muted outbox rows 'skipped' instead
of sending; pure isMuted logic, fail-open on a prefs lookup error.
- notification_preferences table (default-deny RLS); /me toggles and
self-view via validated service-client actions.
Alternate dues payment methods (migration 049):
- Admin sets external pay-here URLs per platform (PayPal/Zeffy/Venmo)
in /settings; members see active ones on /me and pay off-platform;
the treasurer reconciles manually (platform pre-tagged). https-only.
- dues_payment_methods table (SELECT space member, write admin/board).
/me visual pass:
- Restore the chip/preset profile editor (skills/interests/willing-to/
affiliations); promote ChipInput and presets to shared modules.
- Gate the Stripe pay-dues button on whether the space has Stripe
configured; show external links or a contact-admin note otherwise.
Adds a session-closeout subsection capturing the three-audit-pass
discipline that this phase set as a new high-bar (each repeat audit
on the "clean" change set found a real, deploy-blocking issue: the
RPC enumeration vector, the best-effort gap in helpers, the phishing
vector in user-controlled fields exposed by form_submission_admin).
Refreshes the remaining-work list to the post-Phase 4 priority. The
owner-gated end-to-end validation is still the single biggest gap.
Member preferences + in-app inbox are now the natural next product
work (Phase 5; preferences also doubles as the volume governor for
Phase 4 fan-outs). user_has_permission EXECUTE-TO-PUBLIC pre-existing
exposure recorded as a separate triage item with the constraint
written down (RLS policies depend on anon/authenticated EXECUTE, so
the lockdown can't just be copied from migration 047).
Marks the Phase 4 entry DEPLOYED. Deploy log confirms migration 047
applied (applying 047_members_with_permission.sql, REVOKE, GRANT).
Smoke clean: public 200, gated 307, Stripe webhook 400, cron 503 (no
regressions; cron-503 is the expected fails-safe with CRON_SECRET
unset). The new event types are wired but inert at the transport
layer until owner provisions Resend and the cron secret + crontab.
Renames the P4f entry to "first-audit fixes", adds a P4g entry for the
third-audit URL-strip defense, and bumps the test-count line to 572
(40 new cases). The commit list at the top of the section now ends at
09f293e.
Third-pass audit finding. renderShell auto-linkifies any https?:// in
body lines so the manageUrl line becomes a clickable link in the HTML
email. The same regex would happily turn a malicious URL injected into
a user-controlled field (member display_name, equipment / class / form
title, submitter label, space name) into a clickable link.
In Phase 2 dues emails this was self-only: the recipient is the same
member whose display_name appears, so self-phishing is silly. Phase 4
introduces the first email type where one user's display_name lands in
a different user's inbox: form_submission_admin embeds the submitter's
display_name (or, when the form was submitted anonymously and an email
match attributed it to a member, that member's display_name) in an
email read by every forms.manage holder. An authenticated member can
set display_name to "Click https://evil.com for free stuff", submit a
form, and the admin's inbox now has a clickable phishing URL.
body.email is Zod-validated against email format so the typed-email
path is closed, but display_name (z.string().min(1).max(100)) is a
free string. No format restriction will catch a determined attacker.
Mitigation: stripUrls(s) replaces https?://\S+ with [link]. Applied to
every user-controlled input across all four renderers (dues, booking,
class, form) including spaceName, memberName / recipientName, equipment
/ class / form title, location, and submitterLabel. manageUrl, which
buildManageUrl constructs from NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL or a Stripe-
authenticated webhook host, stays untouched and remains the only
linkified URL in the rendered email.
5 new tests cover the new attack vector (form_submission_admin) and
defense-in-depth across booking, class, and dues renderers. Suite 572,
build clean.
DATABASE_SCHEMA: the migration 047 row now records the REVOKE/GRANT
lockdown, with one-line rationale for why it differs from
user_has_permission (RLS policies depend on anon/authenticated being
able to call user_has_permission, so locking it would break policy
evaluation; the new function has no such constraint).
HANDOFF: replaces "Next-most-leverage" with "Highest-priority" in my
pass-56 backlog header. "Leverage" is on the CLAUDE.md style-bans list.
Records the ultrathink audit and the P4f fixes (RPC lockdown + best-
effort enqueue wraps). Also flags pre-existing user_has_permission
EXECUTE TO PUBLIC for separate triage: narrower than the 047 case
(per-uid boolean, only useful within spaces the caller is in), and
locking it down requires careful work because RLS policies depend on
anon/authenticated being able to call it. Out of Phase 4 scope.
Updates the test-count line to 567 (35 new cases) covering the new
helper best-effort no-throw paths.
Two findings from an ultrathink audit of the Phase 4 work.
(1) members_with_permission was callable by any PostgREST client. Postgres
grants EXECUTE on new functions to PUBLIC by default, and this codebase
has no existing REVOKE pattern. The function returns a SET of member_ids
for any (space, permission) pair, so without a lockdown ANY authenticated
caller could enumerate "who has permission X in space Y" for spaces they
are not even members of, learning member_ids and the permission
distribution. user_has_permission has a narrower exposure (per-uid
boolean) and is needed by anon/authenticated for RLS-policy evaluation,
so it stays callable; the new function is locked to service_role since
the only legitimate caller (the form-submission fan-out) goes through
the admin client. Migration 047 + schema.sql now REVOKE EXECUTE FROM
PUBLIC and GRANT TO service_role.
(2) The Phase 4 enqueue blocks in equipment.ts (reserve, cancel) and
classes.ts (signUp, cancelMySignup waitlist promotion, updateSession
session-cancellation fan-out) used the shared helpers, but the helpers
themselves were not internally best-effort. The Stripe webhook's
original enqueueDues wrapped its entire body in try/catch so a thrown
member-lookup error could never bubble into the money path; my refactor
removed that inner wrap and relied on enqueueNotification's
best-effort. resolveMemberContact and getSpaceName could still throw on
a transient supabase network error, which would surface to the action
return value after the underlying mutation already committed: the
client would see an error even though their booking, signup, or
session-cancellation succeeded. Fixed at both layers: the helpers now
swallow throws internally (returning null / empty), and each call site
in equipment/classes is wrapped in try/catch around the lookup chain so
secondary action-specific queries (equipment name+location lookup,
promoted-signup session lookup, session-cancellation signup fan-out)
also cannot leak. forms.submitForm already had the wrap from P4d.
2 new helper tests pin the best-effort behavior; suite 567, build
clean.
Adds an ARCHITECTURE section "Notification breadth: bookings, classes,
forms" describing each new event type, the triggering action, the
recipient rule, and the dedupe-key scheme. Updates Known Limitations #5
to reflect that booking + class + form notifications are no longer "not
wired yet."
API_REFERENCE: extends the Transactional notifications section with the
shared enqueue helper, every new event type, its trigger and recipient,
and the new members_with_permission RPC used for the forms.manage
fan-out.
DATABASE_SCHEMA + DB_SCHEMA_MAP: adds the migration 047 row and the new
helper function to the helper-functions list.
HANDOFF: pass-56 entry covers the four locked design forks, the four
sub-phase commits, test growth (532 -> 565, +33 cases), state (local,
inert post-deploy until owner provisions Resend + CRON_SECRET), the
known fan-out volume tradeoff, and the remaining backlog.
submitForm now enqueues two kinds of notifications, gated per the design:
- form_submission_received: ONLY when the submitter is authenticated
(members or public_auth visibility). Recipient is the verified auth
email (user.email), never the typed body.email. Anonymous public
submissions skip the confirmation because confirming to a typed
address is a victim-spam vector.
- form_submission_admin: one row per member who holds forms.manage in
the space (mirrors the forms-guard / forms RLS gate). Dedupe by
(submission, admin) so a replay is a no-op.
Finding all permission holders without N round-trips needs a new SQL
helper. Migration 047 adds members_with_permission(sid, perm): the
inverted, set-returning form of user_has_permission, with the same
current/late status gate (046) and the same admin shortcut +
space_role_permissions / user_effective_roles fallback. Additive,
introduces no new tables or policies; existing callers unchanged.
Mirrored into schema.sql; types/database.ts updated.
renderFormEmail + formDedupeKey live in notifications-logic; 6 new
render/dedupe unit tests cover both types, fallback labels, escaping.
Suite 565, build clean.
signUpForClass enqueues class_signup_registered or class_signup_waitlisted
based on the RPC return shape; recipient is the affected member, so a
manager signing someone else up still emails the target. cancelMySignup
enqueues class_signup_promoted to whoever was bumped from the waitlist
into the session (the promoted_id returned by class_cancel_tx).
updateSession, when status flips to 'cancelled', fans out a
class_session_cancelled email to every still-active signup (one row per
member, dedupe by session + member).
No type for plain self-cancel: cancelMySignup is self-only and the rule
is "only when someone other than the affected member cancelled," so it
has no caller.
Adds renderClassEmail + classDedupeKey to notifications-logic; 9 new
render/dedupe unit tests cover each type's subject + body and the
session-cancelled per-member dedupe shape.
Suite 559, build clean.
reserveEquipment now enqueues a booking_confirmed email to the booked-for
member (always; a manager booking on someone else's behalf still emails
the target). cancelReservation enqueues a booking_cancelled email ONLY
when the actor is not the affected member, so self-cancels stay silent.
Adds renderBookingEmail + bookingDedupeKey to lib/notifications-logic.ts
(extracts a shared renderShell at the same time so the 6 upcoming
templates do not duplicate the HTML wrapper). 6 new render/dedupe unit
tests cover subject lines, range + location lines, fallback copy when
names are missing, and HTML escaping of injected names.
Suite 550, build clean. No schema change (the notifications.type column
is text), no dispatcher change.
Extracts resolveMemberContact, enqueueNotification, getSpaceName, and
buildManageUrl into lib/notifications/enqueue.ts. The Stripe webhook's
enqueueDues now composes them instead of inlining the member lookup +
upsert. Zero behavior change (same recipient resolution, same upsert
shape, same best-effort wrap, same idempotency via (space_id,
dedupe_key)). Prepares P4b-P4d (equipment/classes/forms enqueue) which
would otherwise copy-paste the same plumbing four times.
12 new unit tests cover the helpers: member lookup hit/miss, upsert
shape, recipient skip on missing-@, best-effort no-throw on error or
exception, URL fallbacks. Suite 544, build clean.
Lifts the deliberately-deferred SECURITY DEFINER status-gate. The
deferral's blocking reason ('no way to verify it breaks nothing') is
resolved by the integration harness, so the gap is now closed at the
RLS layer too (defense-in-depth beyond D2's app layer): an unverified/
inactive member can no longer exercise a role or permission via direct
PostgREST. Scoped to the two privilege entrypoints; get_user_space_ids
+ user_effective_roles deliberately untouched so unverified self-reads/
onboarding still work. Migration 046 + schema.sql mirror. New
integration test (5) proves both halves: gap closed AND
current/late/approval/unverified-reads all unbroken. 31 integration
tests green; default pnpm test 532/26 hermetic; build clean.
Covers the biggest untested orchestration (where the Phase-3 P0s + the
deeper-audit D5 bug lived): real signature verify (good/bad/missing),
per-space vault secret+config resolution, stripe_webhook_events replay
idempotency, applySubscription -> member_billing upsert +
space_members status, and the D5 out-of-order monotonic guard proven
end-to-end (a stale event does NOT rewind current_period_end). Invokes
the actual POST handler against local Supabase with Stripe-signed
events (customer.subscription.updated -> no network, no payments enum).
26 integration tests green; default pnpm test 532/26 hermetic; build
clean. Non-runtime.
Extends the harness to the money/notification replay invariants
(previously only asserted by app code / manual audit):
- stripe_webhook_events PK -> a retried Stripe event id is rejected
(replay protection).
- member_billing UNIQUE(space_id,member_id) -> the webhook's
onConflict upsert never duplicates a member's billing row.
- notifications UNIQUE(space_id,dedupe_key) + ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING
-> a replayed enqueue collapses to exactly one outbox row.
21 integration tests green on real Postgres; default pnpm test
unaffected (hermetic); build clean. Non-runtime.
Root-cause fix for 'correctness depended on post-deploy manual audits'.
Separate psql-driven suite (pnpm test:integration, own vitest config,
integration/ outside __tests__ so the hermetic pnpm test gate is
untouched; self-skips without a DB). 18 tests run against real Postgres:
- 045 class_signup_tx/class_cancel_tx: RETURNS TABLE->array shape the
actions destructure, capacity/waitlist/dedupe, and the per-session
advisory lock under TWO concurrent connections (D11 proven, never
over-enrolls).
- 042 equipment exclusion constraint (overlap 23P01; cancelled/adjacent
ok). 044 self-change trigger (role + payment cols blocked; service
bypass). 043 members_update WITH CHECK (cross-space move blocked).
Disproves the pass-52 flagged risk (signup rpc-shape). Non-runtime;
default pnpm test still 532/26 hermetic; build clean.
The webhook returned raw signature-lib / Postgres error text to the
caller (signature verify is reachable unauthenticated). Now returns
generic 'Invalid signature' / 'Webhook processing error' / 'Webhook
handler error'; the real detail is console.error'd server-side so
debuggability is kept. Stripe only acts on the HTTP status. 532 tests.
The E2 rate-limit block (f11f4b3) added a second `const h = await
headers()` in submitForm where one already existed near the insert,
breaking the build (redeclaration). Renamed the rate-limit one to
rlHdrs. Build green, 532 tests. (f11f4b3 was committed before its
build was verified — process miss; never deployed.)
Anonymous, captcha-less submitForm was an unbounded DB-bloat vector.
Added a generous per-IP+form limit (20/min) — deliberately loose
because legitimate public signups at a hackerspace commonly share one
NAT/wifi IP, so a tight limit would false-block a room; this still
bounds automated flooding. Captcha (the real control) stays the
documented deferred follow-up. 532 tests.
D10 closed the client-facing leak; this completes the defense-in-depth
so a generic-adapter connection's custom auth-param value is also
scrubbed from the operator-readable door_access_log / callDoor reason
regardless of param name. auth_param added to ConnRow +
loadEnabledConnection + the test/selfEntry selects; threaded into every
callDoor (which already redacts reason/snippet by it) and auditDoor
gained an optional authParam. Native HeatSync (e=) was already covered;
this hardens custom generic adapters. 532 tests.
Deferred deeper-audit P1. validateDoorTarget only string-checked the
host; a bare fetch did its own DNS resolution, so a hostname could
resolve to 127.0.0.1/169.254.169.254 between check and connect. The
executor now resolves once (dns.lookup all), rejects if ANY resolved
address is blocked (isBlockedDoorIp: loopback/unspecified/link-local/
metadata incl IPv4-mapped IPv6; RFC1918/LAN/ULA allowed since door
controllers live there), then connects to the validated IP literal so
fetch performs no second resolution (TOCTOU closed). Original Host kept
best-effort; redirect:'manual' retained. Dependency-free (no undici
seam). 33 door-logic tests; suite 532.
Deferred deeper-audit P1. signUpForClass (count->decide->insert) and
cancelMySignup (cancel->recount->promote) were non-atomic: concurrent
signups at the capacity boundary over-enrolled and concurrent cancels
double-promoted waitlisters (dynamic capacity can't be a DB constraint).
Migration 045 adds class_signup_tx/class_cancel_tx (SECURITY DEFINER,
pg_advisory_xact_lock per session) doing the decision+write atomically;
actions call the RPCs and keep all pre-checks. Removed the now-unused
effectiveCapacity/computeSignupStatus/pickPromotion imports +
isUniqueViolation (pure rules still live + tested in classes-logic).
528 tests; build clean.
D6's pre-truncation capped every space's bucket at PER_SPACE=5 before
the round-robin, so a single-space deployment (the common single-
hackerspace case) drained only 5 emails/min instead of 20 — a 4x
slowdown introduced by the fairness fix. Fairness must bind only under
contention: per-space queues are now bounded solely by the CANDIDATES
fetch and the round-robin itself caps any one space's share when
multiple compete; a lone space drains the full BATCH again. Caught
verifying the D1-D10 batch.
Moheeb Zara