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Moheeb Zara ee7f59f1f4 docs: fix ARCHITECTURE limitation #2 (Stripe IS integrated) + HANDOFF pass-53 (F4, 26 integration tests)

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Hackerspace.sh - Architecture Documentation

Last Updated: 2026-05-17
Version: 1.0.0
Status: In production (serving live traffic)

Note: Sections 7 and 13 and the project tree describe an earlier layout. Server actions are split per-domain under lib/actions/*.ts (re-exported from lib/actions/index.ts); there is no monolithic lib/actions.ts. The per-module behavior is current; the module-feature sections later in this document (Certifications, Classes, Equipment, Door, Presence, etc.) are the authoritative reference.

1. System Overview

Hackerspace.sh is a comprehensive member management platform designed for hackerspaces, makerspaces, and community workshops. It provides tools for:

Member Management: Registration, approval workflows, role assignment, payment tracking
Task & Chore System: Recurring tasks, assignment, claiming, completion tracking
Project Management: Kanban-style project tracking with area assignments
Financial Operations: Payment reconciliation, multi-platform integration (PayPal, Zeffy, Venmo)
Communications: Real-time chat via Supabase Realtime
Knowledge Base: Documentation, secrets vault, area lead management
Contacts Management: Vendor, supplier, and partner directory

2. Technology Stack

Frontend

Technology	Version	Purpose
Next.js	16.x	React framework with App Router
React	19.2	UI library
TypeScript	5.x	Type safety
Tailwind CSS	4.x	Styling
shadcn/ui	Latest	Component library
Lucide React	Latest	Icons

Backend

Technology	Version	Purpose
Supabase	Latest	PostgreSQL database, Auth, Realtime
Next.js Server Actions	-	Server-side mutations
Row Level Security (RLS)	-	Database-level authorization

Infrastructure

Service	Purpose
DigitalOcean Droplet	Self-hosted runtime (Docker, systemd, Caddy with Let's Encrypt)
Self-hosted Supabase	Postgres, GoTrue (auth), PostgREST, Realtime, Studio
Resend	Transactional email (SMTP)

3. Project Structure

/
├── app/                          # Next.js App Router
│   ├── (app)/                    # Protected app routes (require auth)
│   │   ├── comms/               # Real-time chat
│   │   ├── contacts/            # Vendor/supplier directory
│   │   ├── dashboard/           # Main dashboard
│   │   ├── import/              # CSV/database import
│   │   ├── members/             # Member management
│   │   ├── ops/                 # Knowledge base, secrets, area leads
│   │   ├── payments/            # Payment reconciliation
│   │   ├── projects/            # Project kanban
│   │   ├── settings/            # Space settings, integrations
│   │   ├── tasks/               # Tasks & chores
│   │   └── layout.tsx           # App shell with sidebar
│   ├── auth/                    # Auth callback routes
│   ├── login/                   # Login page
│   ├── signup/                  # Signup flow (create/join space)
│   ├── globals.css              # Global styles
│   ├── layout.tsx               # Root layout
│   └── page.tsx                 # Landing page (redirect)
├── components/
│   ├── ui/                      # shadcn/ui components
│   ├── app-shell.tsx            # App wrapper
│   ├── app-sidebar.tsx          # Navigation sidebar
│   ├── task-claim-button.tsx    # Task claiming component
│   └── theme-provider.tsx       # Dark/light theme
├── lib/
│   ├── supabase/
│   │   ├── admin.ts             # Service role client (bypasses RLS)
│   │   ├── client.ts            # Browser client
│   │   ├── proxy.ts             # Middleware session refresh
│   │   └── server.ts            # Server Component client
│   ├── actions/                 # Server actions, one module per domain
│   │   ├── index.ts             # Barrel (re-exports every domain module)
│   │   ├── tasks.ts projects.ts members.ts payments.ts …
│   │   └── classes.ts equipment.ts door.ts presence.ts …
│   ├── *-logic.ts               # Pure, unit-tested decision logic
│   ├── *-guard.ts               # Per-feature server-component guards
│   ├── auth-helpers.ts          # requireMember / permission gates
│   └── utils.ts                 # Utility functions (cn)
├── scripts/                     # SQL
│   ├── schema.sql               # Canonical, idempotent (source of truth)
│   ├── 0NN_*.sql                # Numbered incremental migrations (→ 038)
│   └── seed.sql                 # Optional seed data
├── middleware.ts                # Auth middleware
├── docs/                        # This documentation
└── [config files]               # next.config, tsconfig, etc.

4. Authentication Flow

[User] → /signup
    │
    ├─→ Step 1: Account info (name, email, password)
    ├─→ Step 2: Choose Create or Join space
    │
    ├─→ [Create Space Flow]
    │   └─→ supabase.auth.signUp() with metadata:
    │       {
    │         space_action: 'create',
    │         space_name, space_slug, space_city, invite_code
    │       }
    │       └─→ DB Trigger: handle_space_signup()
    │           └─→ INSERT spaces → INSERT space_members (admin)
    │
    └─→ [Join Space Flow]
        └─→ supabase.auth.signUp() with metadata:
            {
              space_action: 'join',
              join_invite_code
            }
            └─→ DB Trigger: handle_space_signup()
                └─→ INSERT space_members (member, status based on require_approval)

[User] → /login
    │
    └─→ supabase.auth.signInWithPassword()
        └─→ Middleware refreshes session
            └─→ App layout checks space_members
                └─→ Has membership? → /dashboard
                └─→ No membership? → /signup

4.3 Returning User (Authenticated, No Space)

[User] → /signup (with active session)
    │
    └─→ Detects user via supabase.auth.getUser()
        └─→ Shows space selection (create/join) only
            └─→ Calls server action: createSpace() or joinSpace()
                └─→ Uses admin client (bypasses RLS)

5. Database Schema

5.1 Core Tables

Table	Purpose	Key Fields
`spaces`	Hackerspace instances	id, name, slug, invite_code, require_approval
`space_members`	User membership records	user_id, space_id, role, tier, status, approved
`tasks`	Tasks and chores	type, status, area, claimed_by, recurrence
`projects`	Project tracking	status (kanban), area, tags, due_date
`knowledge_base`	Documentation	visibility, is_pinned, area
`secrets`	Encrypted credentials	value, area (admin only)
`area_leads`	Area leadership	area_code, lead_id, status
`contacts`	Vendor directory	contact_type, group_label
`payments`	Payment records	platform, amount, member_id, link_status
`comms_channels`	Chat channels	channel_type, area_reference
`comms_messages`	Chat messages	channel_id, user_id, content
`integrations`	Platform connections	platform, is_connected, config
`activity_log`	Audit trail	action, entity_type, entity_id

5.2 Enums (Exact Values)

Enum	Values
`member_role`	admin, board, treasurer, member, associate
`member_tier`	plus, basic, associate
`member_status`	current, late, inactive, unverified
`task_type`	chore, task
`task_status`	open, claimed, in_progress, overdue, due_today, completed, done, blocked
`recurrence_type`	none, daily, weekly, biweekly, monthly
`project_status`	backlog, in_progress, review, done, blocked
`kb_visibility`	all_members, board, admin_only
`contact_type`	vendor, supplier, partner, landlord, city
`payment_platform`	paypal, zeffy, venmo, cash
`payment_link_status`	linked, unlinked
`channel_type`	general, area, ops, project

6. Authorization Model

6.1 Role Hierarchy

Admin (full access)
  │
  ├─ Board (members, payments, projects, board-level secrets)
  │   │
  │   ├─ Treasurer (payments, financial data)
  │   │
  │   └─ Member (tasks, projects, comms, public KB)
  │       │
  │       └─ Associate (read-only, can claim chores)

6.2 RLS Policies Summary

Table	SELECT	INSERT	UPDATE	DELETE
`spaces`	Own space	Admin client	Admin	-
`space_members`	Same space	Self/Admin	Self/Admin	Admin
`tasks`	Members	Members	Members	Members
`projects`	Members	Members	Members	Members
`knowledge_base`	Members (visibility-scoped)	Members	Members	Board/Admin
`secrets`	Admin/Board	Admin	Admin	Admin
`payments`	Treasurer/Board/Admin	Treasurer/Admin	Treasurer/Admin	Treasurer/Admin
`comms_*`	Members	Members	-	Board/Admin

7. Server Actions Reference

7.1 Authentication (`lib/auth-actions.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required	Description
`signIn`	email, password	None	Authenticate user
`signUp`	email, password, fullName, action, ...	None	Create account
`signOut`	-	Authenticated	End session
`getUser`	-	Authenticated	Get current user
`getCurrentMembership`	-	Authenticated	Get member + space
`createSpace`	spaceName, spaceSlug, spaceCity, displayName	Authenticated	Create new space
`joinSpace`	inviteCode, displayName	Authenticated	Join existing space

7.2 Tasks (`lib/actions/tasks.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`createTask`	title, description?, type, area?, recurrence?, due_date?	Member
`claimTask`	taskId	Member
`completeTask`	taskId	Claimant
`deleteTask`	taskId	Member

7.3 Projects (`lib/actions/projects.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`createProject`	title, description?, area?, tags?, due_date?	Member
`updateProjectStatus`	projectId, status	Member
`deleteProject`	projectId	Member

7.4 Members (`lib/actions/members.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`addMember`	display_name, email, phone?, handle?, tier, role, ...	Admin/Board
`updateMember`	memberId, updates	Admin/Board
`approveMember`	memberId	Admin/Board
`removeMember`	memberId	Admin
`importMembers`	rows[]	Admin/Board

7.5 Payments (`lib/actions/payments.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`logCashPayment`	amount, from_note, member_id?, transaction_date?	Treasurer/Admin
`linkPaymentToMember`	paymentId, memberId	Treasurer/Admin
`importPaymentsCsv`	rows[]	Treasurer/Admin

7.6 Knowledge Base & Secrets (`lib/actions/knowledge-base.ts`, `lib/actions/secrets.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`createKbEntry`	title, content, area?, visibility?, is_pinned?, tags?	Member
`updateKbEntry`	entryId, updates	Member
`deleteKbEntry`	entryId	Board/Admin
`createSecret`	title, value, description?, area?	Admin/Board
`deleteSecret`	secretId	Admin
`upsertAreaLead`	area_code, area_name, lead_id?, lead_handle?, status?	Admin/Board

7.7 Contacts (`lib/actions/contacts.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`createContact`	name, contact_type, email?, phone?, ...	Member
`updateContact`	contactId, updates	Member
`deleteContact`	contactId	Member

7.8 Settings (`lib/actions/settings.ts`)

Note: /settings is admin-only and intentionally loads the space's own webhook_secret and integration config so an admin can view/rotate them. That is by-design same-space admin secret management, not a leak; the page redirects non-admins before any of it is fetched.

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`updateSpaceSettings`	name?, slug?, city?, require_approval?, public_member_directory?	Admin
`saveIntegration`	platform, config	Admin
`disconnectIntegration`	platform	Admin
`rotateWebhookSecret`	-	Admin

8. Real-time Features

8.1 Comms (Chat)

The comms feature uses Supabase Realtime for live messaging:

// Client-side subscription
const subscription = supabase
  .channel(`channel:${channelId}`)
  .on('postgres_changes', {
    event: 'INSERT',
    schema: 'public',
    table: 'comms_messages',
    filter: `channel_id=eq.${channelId}`
  }, payload => {
    setMessages(prev => [...prev, payload.new])
  })
  .subscribe()

8.2 Default Channels

Created automatically via DB trigger when a space is created:

general - General discussion
announcements - Official announcements
random - Off-topic
facilities - Building/equipment issues

9. File Structure Details

9.1 Page Components Pattern

Each feature follows a consistent pattern:

feature/
├── page.tsx          # Server Component - fetches data
└── feature-client.tsx # Client Component - UI + interactivity

Example: Tasks

page.tsx: Fetches tasks, members, passes to client
tasks-client.tsx: Renders tabs, modals, handles CRUD actions

9.2 Supabase Client Usage

Location	Client	Use Case
Server Components	`lib/supabase/server.ts`	Data fetching with RLS
Client Components	`lib/supabase/client.ts`	Realtime, client mutations
Server Actions	`lib/supabase/server.ts`	Protected mutations
Admin Operations	`lib/supabase/admin.ts`	Bypasses RLS (signup)
Middleware	`lib/supabase/proxy.ts`	Session refresh

10. Security Considerations

10.1 RLS (Row Level Security)

All tables have RLS enabled. Policies enforce:

Users can only see data from their space
Role-based write permissions
Admin client used only for initial space/member creation

10.2 Admin Client Safety

The admin client (SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY) is used ONLY for:

Creating spaces during signup (trigger handles member creation)
Adding first member to space
Operations where RLS would create circular dependencies

Never expose to client-side code.

10.3 Secrets Storage

Integration credentials:

Secret-named fields (client_secret, *_secret, api_key, secret_key) are encrypted at rest in the AES-256-GCM secrets vault (lib/secrets/vault.ts, same vault Stripe + door use); only a <field>_ref id is kept in integrations.config. Server-side decrypt only, never returned to the client.
Non-secret fields stored in integrations.config (JSONB) with _set indicators; UI shows connected state via the flags, never the value.
Legacy plaintext secrets (pre-vault) are auto-migrated into the vault on the next saveIntegration.

11. Environment Variables

Variable	Required	Description
`NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL`	Yes	Supabase project URL
`NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY`	Yes	Supabase anon key
`SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`	Yes	Admin operations
`SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY`	Yes	AES-256-GCM key for the secrets vault
`NEXT_PUBLIC_OAUTH_GITHUB` / `NEXT_PUBLIC_OAUTH_GOOGLE`	No	Enable social sign-in buttons

.env.example and docs/DEPLOYMENT.md are the authoritative env list. (SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET is not used by the app and was removed from this table.)

12. Migration History

Script	Description
001	Initial schema (13 tables, all enums)
002	Schema fixes, create_default_channels trigger
003	Signup trigger (handle_space_signup)
004	RLS helper functions
005	Additional RLS fixes
006	Comprehensive RLS rewrite
007	Added task_status 'done', contacts note/group_label
008	space_members.approved default=true
009	Member INSERT RLS, UNIQUE(space_id,email)
010	Fixed channel trigger (removed description column)
011	Fixed enum values (active→current, pending→unverified)

Migrations 012-030 are tracked authoritatively in docs/DATABASE_SCHEMA.md (governance kernel, areas, forum/tiers/roles/invites, configurable onboarding, customizable permissions + Ops ACLs, self-change hardening, 026-029 custom forms + waivers + onboarding form step + per-space form slug + invite roles, 030 certifications + Instructor capability, 031 secrets SELECT honors ops.secrets.read, 032 classes + sessions + signups, 033 equipment + reservations, 034 member access cards + door permissions, 035 door connections + access log).

Forms & waivers (migrations 026-029; complete Phases 1-5)

forms and form_submissions back a custom form/waiver builder. The feature is complete (Phases 1-5): schema + RLS; server actions in lib/actions/forms.ts; the builder UI under /forms (with starter templates) + the public /f/[space]/[slug] page + a member-facing /my-forms list; onboarding form step type with required-waiver enforcement + auto-satisfy (migration 027); per-space form slug (028); verified-email retro-link of anonymous submissions (claimMyAnonymousSubmissions, hooked from joinSpace and finishOnboarding; admin manual-link for unverified/admin-added members). Invite codes can grant a role with usage caps (029; /join/[space]). Security shape: all submissions (anonymous, public-authenticated, or members) are written by a single validated server action using the service client AFTER server-side schema validation and snapshotting (same pattern as finishOnboarding); the form_submissions table has no INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policy, so RLS hard-denies every non-service client; submissions are immutable to clients but a forms.manage holder can permanently delete an individual submission (deleteSubmission) or a whole form (deleteForm, which FK-cascades all its submissions including signed waivers) through validated service-client actions behind destructive UI confirms (deleteForm also requires an explicit confirm:true). The public fill page is served by a service-client server action, so the anon Postgres role gets no grant on forms. Form management is gated by the new additive forms.manage permission via user_has_permission.

Email-match association (migration 039 + app, owner-chosen 2026-05): a submission is linked to a member whenever submitter_email matches a member in the space — at submit time, on member add/email-change (linkSubmissionsByEmail), via self-claim at join/onboarding, and a one-time backfill. This intentionally includes raw anonymous submissions (attribution only, no access); the tradeoff is documented inline in submitForm so it is not mistaken for a bug. forms.manage holders see a member's submissions on the /members per-member panel (listMemberSubmissions, RLS-honoring, metadata only).

Certifications & Instructor (migration 030)

certifications (per-space cert types; optional validity_months; is_active archive) and member_certifications (per-member grants) back a certification tracker. Pure decision logic is isolated in lib/certifications-logic.ts (computeExpiry with month/leap-year clamping; certificationStatus = revoked > expired > expiring_soon > active), unit-tested. Server actions in lib/actions/certifications.ts. Two new additive permissions: certifications.manage (cert types, gates /certifications admin pages via lib/certifications-guard.ts) and certifications.grant (award/revoke = the Instructor capability, assignable to any role/area-lead through the existing space_role_permissions model, NOT a new built-in role). The per-member award/revoke/renew panel is reachable from a "Certs" column on /members shown to any certifications.grant holder (independent of admin/board). Members see their own grants + effective permissions read-only at /me. RLS is additive and default-deny: cert types readable by any space member; grants readable by managers/granters (all) or the member (own); member_certifications has no DELETE policy so grant/revoke history is immutable (revoke is a soft revoked_at UPDATE). Expiry is snapshotted at grant time so later edits to the cert type never retroactively change an existing grant. There is no anonymous path.

Classes (migrations 032, 037)

classes (offering), class_sessions (scheduled occurrence), and class_signups (member signup) back a class scheduler. Pure logic in lib/classes-logic.ts (effectiveCapacity, computeSignupStatus, canSignUp, signupFormEligibility, pickPromotion), unit-tested. Server actions in lib/actions/classes.ts. Two additive permissions: classes.manage (class/session CRUD, gates /classes/manage via lib/classes-guard.ts) and classes.instruct (attendance, completion, attendee list). Member signup needs only membership. /classes is the member calendar (sign up / waitlist / cancel); the member's own signups also appear on /me. RLS is additive and default-deny: classes readable by managers (all) or members (active only), sessions by any space member, signups by managers/instructors (all) or the member (own) with instructor-only UPDATE and no INSERT/DELETE policy so signup/cancel funnels through one validated service-client action that enforces capacity/waitlist/dedupe and promotes the earliest waitlisted member when a seat frees. A class may optionally set required_form_id (migration 037): signup is then hard-gated on the member having a form_submissions row for that form on file (waiver model), checked via the service client since a class manager need not hold forms.manage; a classes.manage holder gets the override and may also sign a member up on their behalf (mirrors the equipment required-cert gate). The member calendar shows the requirement and links to the public form; the per-session signup roster is reused on /classes/manage behind a toggle for staff (members never see who else signed up). Completing a session can award the class's certification, but only through the normal grantCertification path, so it still requires the acting instructor to hold certifications.grant; otherwise completion succeeds and the result reports the certificates were skipped (no service-role bypass of the guarded certifications surface). No anonymous path.

Equipment (migration 033)

equipment (registry; status available/maintenance/retired; optional required_certification_id; is_active archive) and equipment_reservations (member time-window reservation) back a tool reservation system. Pure logic in lib/equipment-logic.ts (intervalsOverlap, hasConflict, reservationEligibility), unit-tested. Server actions in lib/actions/equipment.ts. One additive permission, equipment.manage (registry CRUD + adjust/cancel any reservation, gates /equipment/manage via lib/equipment-guard.ts). Members reserve with only membership. /equipment is the member catalog (reserve), /me lists the member's own reservations. RLS is additive and default-deny: equipment readable by managers (all) or members (active only), reservations by managers (all) or the member (own) with manager-only UPDATE and no INSERT/DELETE policy so reserve/cancel funnels through one validated service-client action that enforces the equipment status, the no-overlap rule, and the required-certification gate (checked against the normal member_certifications data; an equipment.manage holder gets the override and may book on a member's behalf). No anonymous path.

Door / access control (migrations 034-036; epic in progress)

Phased; P1-P3 built, including member self-entry (reviewed at the locked checkpoint, then built). member_cards (034) associates RFID/NFC UIDs to members; the UID is a credential (door.manage-only RLS, no member SELECT; masked count+last4 self-view via a service-client action). door.manage / door.operate permissions (group Access). door_connections (035) is a per-space controller integration: the shared password is NOT stored on the row — secret_ref points at the existing AES-256-GCM secrets vault and is decrypted server-side only. pinned_host is the SSRF pin. Pure logic in lib/door-logic.ts (SSRF validateDoorTarget, always-blocked metadata/ link-local, native HeatSync encoders with the firmware-verified fixed-width zero-padding, generic template substitution, secret redaction) is heavily unit-tested. lib/door/executor.ts is the single hardened egress: it re-validates the target against the pin, refuses redirects, caps time and body, and redacts secrets before any audit write. door_access_log is an append-only, secrets-redacted audit with no client write policy (validated service-client executor only). /door/manage (door.manage) configures connections, picks a vault secret, and runs a safe status-only test. Phase 3 (036) adds the live actions, all door.operate, rate-limited, each writing one redacted door_access_log row, reading through the service client after the permission check (operators have no RLS read on door_connections/member_cards). door_card_slots is the per-connection integer-slot allocation map for controllers that key cards by slot (HeatSync 0-200); the lowest-free policy is pure unit-tested logic (lib/door-slots-logic.ts), UNIQUE (connection_id, slot) lets the DB arbitrate concurrent grants, UNIQUE (connection_id, card_id) makes re-grant idempotent. grantCard reserves the slot in the DB first, calls the controller, and rolls the reservation back if the call fails; revokeCard is idempotent and frees the slot only on confirmed controller success so the app map never diverges from the device; doorControl (open/unlock/lock) touches no slot. /door/manage surfaces these to door.operate holders. Member self-entry (selfEntry) is built: any active member with at least one active card on file may trigger a momentary OPEN on a connection that is enabled and has allow_member_self_entry on (opt-in, off by default; the locked eligibility rule is "any active card", no door_card_slots row required). Membership/cards are resolved server-side, strict per-member rate limit, one redacted self_entry audit row; surfaced as a "Door access" panel on the dashboard and on the member /doors page (self-entry + masked own cards via getMyCards + the member's own recent activity via listMyDoorActivity, a service-client read after requireMember filtered to that member), hidden entirely for ineligible members. Phases 4-5 add inbound log ingest and the universal API-call UI builder. No anonymous path.

Presence & attendance (migration 038)

space_visits records one row per visit (check-in/out, is_host, in/out notes); an open row (checked_out_at IS NULL) means the member is here. A partial unique index keeps at most one open visit per member. Pure logic in lib/presence-logic.ts (presenceStatus, hostEligibility, summarizePresence), unit-tested. Server actions in lib/actions/presence.ts are self-only (member resolved server-side) and funnel through the service client; space_visits has SELECT for any space member (presence is social) and no client write policy. There is no new permission code: current presence is visible to all members, the org-wide /attendance history is all-members by product decision, and every member sees their own history on /me. Forgotten check-outs are handled without a cron: an open visit older than PRESENCE_MAX_OPEN_HOURS (18h) is treated as not-present in pure logic and auto-closed on the member's next check-in. Checking in as a host is gated by spaces.host_requires_card (default true): when set, the member needs an active member_card on file (reuses the access-card model); a space may relax it to let anyone self-mark host. Surfaced as the dashboard "Who's here" panel, the /attendance page, and "My recent visits" on /me. No anonymous path.

Stripe recurring dues (migration 040; product spine Phase 1)

Per-space OWN Stripe account (NOT Connect): the secret key + webhook signing secret live encrypted in the AES-256-GCM secrets vault (the door secret pattern), referenced by id from integrations.config which also holds the mode, publishable key, tier→Price map and grace days. Pure mapping logic in lib/stripe-logic.ts (pinned API version, duesMemberStatus, graceExceeded) is unit-tested; lib/stripe/client.ts builds a per-request Stripe client (never global, never client-exposed); lib/stripe/config.ts holds the vault/config helpers (plain server module, not 'use server', since they take the admin client). Members pay via a hosted Checkout Session (subscription mode) and self-serve via the hosted Billing Portal — card data never touches the app (SAQ A). The per-space webhook POST /api/stripe/webhook/[space] verifies the signature with that space's signing secret, is idempotent on Stripe's event id (stripe_webhook_events), and maps the subscription lifecycle onto member_billing + a stripe payments row + space_members.status (grace → late, never auto-inactive, never auto-approves unverified). member_billing SELECT = admin/board/treasurer with no client write policy (webhook/service-client only); the member self-view is a validated action. No new permission code. Phases 2-3 (transactional notifications, broader self-serve) build on this.

Transactional notifications (migration 041; product spine Phase 2)

Outbox + dispatcher, not inline send. The Stripe webhook only writes a notifications row (invoice.paid → dues_renewed, invoice.payment_failed → dues_payment_failed, lapse-to-late → dues_lapsed); it never calls the mail provider, so the money path stays fast and retry-safe. The (space_id, dedupe_key) unique index makes a Stripe event replay a no-op (ignoreDuplicates). Pure render + dedupe logic in lib/notifications-logic.ts is unit-tested (HTML-escaped, brand-neutral copy). lib/email/send.ts is a one-function transport seam over Resend's HTTP API (no SDK; fetch) returning a retryable flag; a self-hosted deploy can swap it for SMTP without touching callers, and an unset RESEND_API_KEY is a clean non-retryable no-op. The dispatcher POST /api/cron/notifications (constant-time CRON_SECRET bearer, no session — proxy.ts whitelists /api/cron) drains ≤20 pending rows per run, passing each row id as Resend's Idempotency-Key so an overlapping run cannot double-send; transient failures stay pending until the attempt budget is spent, permanent ones go failed. notifications SELECT = admin/board/treasurer, no client write policy; the member self-view (getMyNotifications, surfaced on /me) is a validated action. The droplet's crontab POSTs once a minute. No new permission code.

Member self-serve portal (`/me`; product spine Phase 3)

/me is a 3-tab portal (Profile / Membership / Activity). The server page does all data fetching and passes plain data to a single client portal component (me-portal-client.tsx) that owns tab state and rendering; the read-only sections were moved verbatim from the prior flat page (no behavior change in the shell). Profile editing and inline cancels reuse existing server actions (updateMyProfile, discloseAffiliations, cancelMySignup, cancelReservation) — no new mutation surface, server-side ownership/space scoping unchanged. getMyPayments follows the established service-client self-view convention (treasurer-scoped RLS, strictly scoped to the caller). Self-service email change goes through Supabase Auth (updateUser + /auth/confirm verifyOtp); the denormalized space_members.email is synced only post-verification. The email-change flow depends on Supabase project config (template + redirect allowlist; see DEPLOYMENT) and is inert until that is set. No new permission code, no schema change.

13. Known Limitations

Test suite - Extensive Vitest unit coverage of pure logic (__tests__/, run with pnpm test) plus Playwright smoke e2e (e2e/). Gap: server-action orchestration is not unit-tested (no Supabase mock harness); e2e is mostly page-render checks, not full write/RLS flows.
Payment integrations - Stripe recurring dues IS integrated (product spine Phase 1: per-space keys, hosted Checkout/Portal, the per-space signed webhook). A PayPal sync endpoint exists (app/api/paypal/sync/route.ts). Manual import/CSV reconciliation remains the path for ad-hoc/other-platform payments; Zeffy/Venmo live APIs are not integrated.
Social auth - GitHub/Google sign-in is wired, gated by the NEXT_PUBLIC_OAUTH_GITHUB/NEXT_PUBLIC_OAUTH_GOOGLE env flags.
Webhooks - The HMAC signing contract and secret rotation exist; per-event delivery is not implemented (see docs/WEBHOOKS.md).
Email notifications - Dues-lifecycle transactional email is implemented (migration 041: notifications outbox + Resend transport + dispatcher cron). Other domains (bookings, forms) are not wired yet but reuse the same outbox.
Search - Client-side filtering only, no server-side full-text search.
Single space per user - The auth resolver assumes one active membership per user; a user in 2+ spaces is not supported (no space switcher). Fails closed.

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