Files

T

Moheeb Zara 6d1c8536cd feat(door): member self-entry on the dashboard (locked design)

selfEntry({connectionId}): any active member with >=1 active card on file
may trigger a momentary open on a connection that is enabled and has
allow_member_self_entry on (locked rule: any active card, no slot row
required). Membership/cards resolved server-side so a member can only open
for themselves; never unlock/lock/grant/revoke; never anonymous. Strict
5/min per-member rate limit, one redacted self_entry audit row (denials
audited too), through the existing hardened executor. listSelfEntryDoors
returns the enabled self-entry connections only when the caller has an
active card, so the dashboard 'Door access' panel is hidden for
ineligible members. API_REFERENCE + ARCHITECTURE + HANDOFF pass-28.

2026-05-16 21:21:09 -07:00

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Hackerspace.sh - Architecture Documentation

Last Updated: 2026-03-10
Version: 1.0.0
Status: Pre-Production Audit

1. System Overview

Hackerspace.sh is a comprehensive member management platform designed for hackerspaces, makerspaces, and community workshops. It provides tools for:

Member Management: Registration, approval workflows, role assignment, payment tracking
Task & Chore System: Recurring tasks, assignment, claiming, completion tracking
Project Management: Kanban-style project tracking with area assignments
Financial Operations: Payment reconciliation, multi-platform integration (PayPal, Zeffy, Venmo)
Communications: Real-time chat via Supabase Realtime
Knowledge Base: Documentation, secrets vault, area lead management
Contacts Management: Vendor, supplier, and partner directory

2. Technology Stack

Frontend

Technology	Version	Purpose
Next.js	16.x	React framework with App Router
React	19.2	UI library
TypeScript	5.x	Type safety
Tailwind CSS	4.x	Styling
shadcn/ui	Latest	Component library
Lucide React	Latest	Icons

Backend

Technology	Version	Purpose
Supabase	Latest	PostgreSQL database, Auth, Realtime
Next.js Server Actions	-	Server-side mutations
Row Level Security (RLS)	-	Database-level authorization

Infrastructure

Service	Purpose
DigitalOcean Droplet	Self-hosted runtime (Docker, systemd, Caddy with Let's Encrypt)
Self-hosted Supabase	Postgres, GoTrue (auth), PostgREST, Realtime, Studio
Resend	Transactional email (SMTP)

3. Project Structure

/
├── app/                          # Next.js App Router
│   ├── (app)/                    # Protected app routes (require auth)
│   │   ├── comms/               # Real-time chat
│   │   ├── contacts/            # Vendor/supplier directory
│   │   ├── dashboard/           # Main dashboard
│   │   ├── import/              # CSV/database import
│   │   ├── members/             # Member management
│   │   ├── ops/                 # Knowledge base, secrets, area leads
│   │   ├── payments/            # Payment reconciliation
│   │   ├── projects/            # Project kanban
│   │   ├── settings/            # Space settings, integrations
│   │   ├── tasks/               # Tasks & chores
│   │   └── layout.tsx           # App shell with sidebar
│   ├── auth/                    # Auth callback routes
│   ├── login/                   # Login page
│   ├── signup/                  # Signup flow (create/join space)
│   ├── globals.css              # Global styles
│   ├── layout.tsx               # Root layout
│   └── page.tsx                 # Landing page (redirect)
├── components/
│   ├── ui/                      # shadcn/ui components
│   ├── app-shell.tsx            # App wrapper
│   ├── app-sidebar.tsx          # Navigation sidebar
│   ├── task-claim-button.tsx    # Task claiming component
│   └── theme-provider.tsx       # Dark/light theme
├── lib/
│   ├── supabase/
│   │   ├── admin.ts             # Service role client (bypasses RLS)
│   │   ├── client.ts            # Browser client
│   │   ├── proxy.ts             # Middleware session refresh
│   │   └── server.ts            # Server Component client
│   ├── actions.ts               # All server actions (CRUD)
│   ├── auth-actions.ts          # Auth-specific actions
│   ├── types.ts                 # TypeScript interfaces
│   └── utils.ts                 # Utility functions (cn)
├── scripts/                     # SQL migrations
│   ├── 000_reset_schema.sql    # Schema reset (dev only)
│   ├── 001_create_schema.sql   # Initial schema
│   ├── 002-011_*.sql           # Incremental fixes
│   └── patch-dashboard.mjs     # Utility script
├── middleware.ts                # Auth middleware
├── docs/                        # This documentation
└── [config files]               # next.config, tsconfig, etc.

4. Authentication Flow

[User] → /signup
    │
    ├─→ Step 1: Account info (name, email, password)
    ├─→ Step 2: Choose Create or Join space
    │
    ├─→ [Create Space Flow]
    │   └─→ supabase.auth.signUp() with metadata:
    │       {
    │         space_action: 'create',
    │         space_name, space_slug, space_city, invite_code
    │       }
    │       └─→ DB Trigger: handle_space_signup()
    │           └─→ INSERT spaces → INSERT space_members (admin)
    │
    └─→ [Join Space Flow]
        └─→ supabase.auth.signUp() with metadata:
            {
              space_action: 'join',
              join_invite_code
            }
            └─→ DB Trigger: handle_space_signup()
                └─→ INSERT space_members (member, status based on require_approval)

[User] → /login
    │
    └─→ supabase.auth.signInWithPassword()
        └─→ Middleware refreshes session
            └─→ App layout checks space_members
                └─→ Has membership? → /dashboard
                └─→ No membership? → /signup

4.3 Returning User (Authenticated, No Space)

[User] → /signup (with active session)
    │
    └─→ Detects user via supabase.auth.getUser()
        └─→ Shows space selection (create/join) only
            └─→ Calls server action: createSpace() or joinSpace()
                └─→ Uses admin client (bypasses RLS)

5. Database Schema

5.1 Core Tables

Table	Purpose	Key Fields
`spaces`	Hackerspace instances	id, name, slug, invite_code, require_approval
`space_members`	User membership records	user_id, space_id, role, tier, status, approved
`tasks`	Tasks and chores	type, status, area, claimed_by, recurrence
`projects`	Project tracking	status (kanban), area, tags, due_date
`knowledge_base`	Documentation	visibility, is_pinned, area
`secrets`	Encrypted credentials	value, area (admin only)
`area_leads`	Area leadership	area_code, lead_id, status
`contacts`	Vendor directory	contact_type, group_label
`payments`	Payment records	platform, amount, member_id, link_status
`comms_channels`	Chat channels	channel_type, area_reference
`comms_messages`	Chat messages	channel_id, user_id, content
`integrations`	Platform connections	platform, is_connected, config
`activity_log`	Audit trail	action, entity_type, entity_id

5.2 Enums (Exact Values)

Enum	Values
`member_role`	admin, board, treasurer, member, associate
`member_tier`	plus, basic, associate
`member_status`	current, late, inactive, unverified
`task_type`	chore, task
`task_status`	open, claimed, in_progress, overdue, due_today, completed, done, blocked
`recurrence_type`	none, daily, weekly, biweekly, monthly
`project_status`	backlog, in_progress, review, done, blocked
`kb_visibility`	all_members, board, admin_only
`contact_type`	vendor, supplier, partner, landlord, city
`payment_platform`	paypal, zeffy, venmo, cash
`payment_link_status`	linked, unlinked
`channel_type`	general, area, ops, project

6. Authorization Model

6.1 Role Hierarchy

Admin (full access)
  │
  ├─ Board (members, payments, projects, board-level secrets)
  │   │
  │   ├─ Treasurer (payments, financial data)
  │   │
  │   └─ Member (tasks, projects, comms, public KB)
  │       │
  │       └─ Associate (read-only, can claim chores)

6.2 RLS Policies Summary

Table	SELECT	INSERT	UPDATE	DELETE
`spaces`	Own space	Admin client	Admin	-
`space_members`	Same space	Self/Admin	Self/Admin	Admin
`tasks`	Members	Members	Members	Members
`projects`	Members	Members	Members	Members
`knowledge_base`	Members (visibility-scoped)	Members	Members	Board/Admin
`secrets`	Admin/Board	Admin	Admin	Admin
`payments`	Treasurer/Board/Admin	Treasurer/Admin	Treasurer/Admin	Treasurer/Admin
`comms_*`	Members	Members	-	Board/Admin

7. Server Actions Reference

7.1 Authentication (`lib/auth-actions.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required	Description
`signIn`	email, password	None	Authenticate user
`signUp`	email, password, fullName, action, ...	None	Create account
`signOut`	-	Authenticated	End session
`getUser`	-	Authenticated	Get current user
`getCurrentMembership`	-	Authenticated	Get member + space
`createSpace`	spaceName, spaceSlug, spaceCity, displayName	Authenticated	Create new space
`joinSpace`	inviteCode, displayName	Authenticated	Join existing space

7.2 Tasks (`lib/actions.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`createTask`	title, description?, type, area?, recurrence?, due_date?	Member
`claimTask`	taskId	Member
`completeTask`	taskId	Claimant
`deleteTask`	taskId	Member

7.3 Projects (`lib/actions.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`createProject`	title, description?, area?, tags?, due_date?	Member
`updateProjectStatus`	projectId, status	Member
`deleteProject`	projectId	Member

7.4 Members (`lib/actions.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`addMember`	display_name, email, phone?, handle?, tier, role, ...	Admin/Board
`updateMember`	memberId, updates	Admin/Board
`approveMember`	memberId	Admin/Board
`removeMember`	memberId	Admin
`importMembers`	rows[]	Admin/Board

7.5 Payments (`lib/actions.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`logCashPayment`	amount, from_note, member_id?, transaction_date?	Treasurer/Admin
`linkPaymentToMember`	paymentId, memberId	Treasurer/Admin
`importPaymentsCsv`	rows[]	Treasurer/Admin

7.6 Knowledge Base & Secrets (`lib/actions.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`createKbEntry`	title, content, area?, visibility?, is_pinned?, tags?	Member
`updateKbEntry`	entryId, updates	Member
`deleteKbEntry`	entryId	Board/Admin
`createSecret`	title, value, description?, area?	Admin/Board
`deleteSecret`	secretId	Admin
`upsertAreaLead`	area_code, area_name, lead_id?, lead_handle?, status?	Admin/Board

7.7 Contacts (`lib/actions.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`createContact`	name, contact_type, email?, phone?, ...	Member
`updateContact`	contactId, updates	Member
`deleteContact`	contactId	Member

7.8 Settings (`lib/actions.ts`)

Action	Parameters	Role Required
`updateSpaceSettings`	name?, slug?, city?, require_approval?, public_member_directory?	Admin
`saveIntegration`	platform, config	Admin
`disconnectIntegration`	platform	Admin
`rotateWebhookSecret`	-	Admin

8. Real-time Features

8.1 Comms (Chat)

The comms feature uses Supabase Realtime for live messaging:

// Client-side subscription
const subscription = supabase
  .channel(`channel:${channelId}`)
  .on('postgres_changes', {
    event: 'INSERT',
    schema: 'public',
    table: 'comms_messages',
    filter: `channel_id=eq.${channelId}`
  }, payload => {
    setMessages(prev => [...prev, payload.new])
  })
  .subscribe()

8.2 Default Channels

Created automatically via DB trigger when a space is created:

general - General discussion
announcements - Official announcements
random - Off-topic
facilities - Building/equipment issues

9. File Structure Details

9.1 Page Components Pattern

Each feature follows a consistent pattern:

feature/
├── page.tsx          # Server Component - fetches data
└── feature-client.tsx # Client Component - UI + interactivity

Example: Tasks

page.tsx: Fetches tasks, members, passes to client
tasks-client.tsx: Renders tabs, modals, handles CRUD actions

9.2 Supabase Client Usage

Location	Client	Use Case
Server Components	`lib/supabase/server.ts`	Data fetching with RLS
Client Components	`lib/supabase/client.ts`	Realtime, client mutations
Server Actions	`lib/supabase/server.ts`	Protected mutations
Admin Operations	`lib/supabase/admin.ts`	Bypasses RLS (signup)
Middleware	`lib/supabase/proxy.ts`	Session refresh

10. Security Considerations

10.1 RLS (Row Level Security)

All tables have RLS enabled. Policies enforce:

Users can only see data from their space
Role-based write permissions
Admin client used only for initial space/member creation

10.2 Admin Client Safety

The admin client (SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY) is used ONLY for:

Creating spaces during signup (trigger handles member creation)
Adding first member to space
Operations where RLS would create circular dependencies

Never expose to client-side code.

10.3 Secrets Storage

Integration credentials stored in integrations.config (JSONB):

Values stored with _set indicators
UI shows masked values
Consider encryption at rest for production

11. Environment Variables

Variable	Required	Description
`NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_URL`	Yes	Supabase project URL
`NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY`	Yes	Supabase anon key
`SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`	Yes	Admin operations
`SUPABASE_JWT_SECRET`	Yes	JWT verification

12. Migration History

Script	Description
001	Initial schema (13 tables, all enums)
002	Schema fixes, create_default_channels trigger
003	Signup trigger (handle_space_signup)
004	RLS helper functions
005	Additional RLS fixes
006	Comprehensive RLS rewrite
007	Added task_status 'done', contacts note/group_label
008	space_members.approved default=true
009	Member INSERT RLS, UNIQUE(space_id,email)
010	Fixed channel trigger (removed description column)
011	Fixed enum values (active→current, pending→unverified)

Migrations 012-030 are tracked authoritatively in docs/DATABASE_SCHEMA.md (governance kernel, areas, forum/tiers/roles/invites, configurable onboarding, customizable permissions + Ops ACLs, self-change hardening, 026-029 custom forms + waivers + onboarding form step + per-space form slug + invite roles, 030 certifications + Instructor capability, 031 secrets SELECT honors ops.secrets.read, 032 classes + sessions + signups, 033 equipment + reservations, 034 member access cards + door permissions, 035 door connections + access log).

Forms & waivers (migrations 026-029; complete Phases 1-5)

forms and form_submissions back a custom form/waiver builder. The feature is complete (Phases 1-5): schema + RLS; server actions in lib/actions/forms.ts; the builder UI under /forms (with starter templates) + the public /f/[space]/[slug] page + a member-facing /my-forms list; onboarding form step type with required-waiver enforcement + auto-satisfy (migration 027); per-space form slug (028); verified-email retro-link of anonymous submissions (claimMyAnonymousSubmissions, hooked from joinSpace and finishOnboarding; admin manual-link for unverified/admin-added members). Invite codes can grant a role with usage caps (029; /join/[space]). Security shape: all submissions (anonymous, public-authenticated, or members) are written by a single validated server action using the service client AFTER server-side schema validation and snapshotting (same pattern as finishOnboarding); the form_submissions table has no INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policy, so RLS hard-denies every non-service client and submissions are immutable. The public fill page is served by a service-client server action, so the anon Postgres role gets no grant on forms. Form management is gated by the new additive forms.manage permission via user_has_permission.

Certifications & Instructor (migration 030)

certifications (per-space cert types; optional validity_months; is_active archive) and member_certifications (per-member grants) back a certification tracker. Pure decision logic is isolated in lib/certifications-logic.ts (computeExpiry with month/leap-year clamping; certificationStatus = revoked > expired > expiring_soon > active), unit-tested. Server actions in lib/actions/certifications.ts. Two new additive permissions: certifications.manage (cert types, gates /certifications admin pages via lib/certifications-guard.ts) and certifications.grant (award/revoke = the Instructor capability, assignable to any role/area-lead through the existing space_role_permissions model, NOT a new built-in role). The per-member award/revoke/renew panel is reachable from a "Certs" column on /members shown to any certifications.grant holder (independent of admin/board). Members see their own grants + effective permissions read-only at /me. RLS is additive and default-deny: cert types readable by any space member; grants readable by managers/granters (all) or the member (own); member_certifications has no DELETE policy so grant/revoke history is immutable (revoke is a soft revoked_at UPDATE). Expiry is snapshotted at grant time so later edits to the cert type never retroactively change an existing grant. There is no anonymous path.

Classes (migration 032)

classes (offering), class_sessions (scheduled occurrence), and class_signups (member signup) back a class scheduler. Pure logic in lib/classes-logic.ts (effectiveCapacity, computeSignupStatus, canSignUp, pickPromotion), unit-tested. Server actions in lib/actions/classes.ts. Two additive permissions: classes.manage (class/session CRUD, gates /classes/manage via lib/classes-guard.ts) and classes.instruct (attendance, completion, attendee list). Member signup needs only membership. /classes is the member calendar (sign up / waitlist / cancel); the member's own signups also appear on /me. RLS is additive and default-deny: classes readable by managers (all) or members (active only), sessions by any space member, signups by managers/instructors (all) or the member (own) with instructor-only UPDATE and no INSERT/DELETE policy so signup/cancel funnels through one validated service-client action that enforces capacity/waitlist/dedupe and promotes the earliest waitlisted member when a seat frees. Completing a session can award the class's certification, but only through the normal grantCertification path, so it still requires the acting instructor to hold certifications.grant; otherwise completion succeeds and the result reports the certificates were skipped (no service-role bypass of the guarded certifications surface). No anonymous path.

Equipment (migration 033)

equipment (registry; status available/maintenance/retired; optional required_certification_id; is_active archive) and equipment_reservations (member time-window reservation) back a tool reservation system. Pure logic in lib/equipment-logic.ts (intervalsOverlap, hasConflict, reservationEligibility), unit-tested. Server actions in lib/actions/equipment.ts. One additive permission, equipment.manage (registry CRUD + adjust/cancel any reservation, gates /equipment/manage via lib/equipment-guard.ts). Members reserve with only membership. /equipment is the member catalog (reserve), /me lists the member's own reservations. RLS is additive and default-deny: equipment readable by managers (all) or members (active only), reservations by managers (all) or the member (own) with manager-only UPDATE and no INSERT/DELETE policy so reserve/cancel funnels through one validated service-client action that enforces the equipment status, the no-overlap rule, and the required-certification gate (checked against the normal member_certifications data; an equipment.manage holder gets the override and may book on a member's behalf). No anonymous path.

Door / access control (migrations 034-036; epic in progress)

Phased; P1-P3 built, including member self-entry (reviewed at the locked checkpoint, then built). member_cards (034) associates RFID/NFC UIDs to members; the UID is a credential (door.manage-only RLS, no member SELECT; masked count+last4 self-view via a service-client action). door.manage / door.operate permissions (group Access). door_connections (035) is a per-space controller integration: the shared password is NOT stored on the row — secret_ref points at the existing AES-256-GCM secrets vault and is decrypted server-side only. pinned_host is the SSRF pin. Pure logic in lib/door-logic.ts (SSRF validateDoorTarget, always-blocked metadata/ link-local, native HeatSync encoders with the firmware-verified fixed-width zero-padding, generic template substitution, secret redaction) is heavily unit-tested. lib/door/executor.ts is the single hardened egress: it re-validates the target against the pin, refuses redirects, caps time and body, and redacts secrets before any audit write. door_access_log is an append-only, secrets-redacted audit with no client write policy (validated service-client executor only). /door/manage (door.manage) configures connections, picks a vault secret, and runs a safe status-only test. Phase 3 (036) adds the live actions, all door.operate, rate-limited, each writing one redacted door_access_log row, reading through the service client after the permission check (operators have no RLS read on door_connections/member_cards). door_card_slots is the per-connection integer-slot allocation map for controllers that key cards by slot (HeatSync 0-200); the lowest-free policy is pure unit-tested logic (lib/door-slots-logic.ts), UNIQUE (connection_id, slot) lets the DB arbitrate concurrent grants, UNIQUE (connection_id, card_id) makes re-grant idempotent. grantCard reserves the slot in the DB first, calls the controller, and rolls the reservation back if the call fails; revokeCard is idempotent and frees the slot only on confirmed controller success so the app map never diverges from the device; doorControl (open/unlock/lock) touches no slot. /door/manage surfaces these to door.operate holders. Member self-entry (selfEntry) is built: any active member with at least one active card on file may trigger a momentary OPEN on a connection that is enabled and has allow_member_self_entry on (opt-in, off by default; the locked eligibility rule is "any active card", no door_card_slots row required). Membership/cards are resolved server-side, strict per-member rate limit, one redacted self_entry audit row; surfaced as a "Door access" panel on the dashboard, hidden entirely for ineligible members. Phases 4-5 add inbound log ingest and the universal API-call UI builder. No anonymous path.

13. Known Limitations

No test suite - Unit, integration, and E2E tests needed
Payment integrations - UI only, no actual OAuth/API
Import feature - UI only, no file processing
Database connector - UI only, not implemented
Social auth - GitHub/Google buttons present but not wired
Webhook endpoint - URL shown but no actual endpoint
Email notifications - Not implemented
Search - Client-side only, no full-text search

24 KiB Raw Blame History