Production: a basic member filing an incident (incl. anonymous) hit an RLS violation on table incidents. Not reproducible from source; the code and the 016/017 policy both permit it, so it is a deployed policy/data divergence. - scripts/025 idempotently re-asserts incidents_insert verbatim from 017/schema.sql so a drifted deployment converges to the known-good policy. Access-neutral, no schema change. - fileIncident maps an RLS rejection to an actionable message and logs the technical detail server-side instead of raw Postgres. Minimal hotfix off origin/main: only the two production-affecting files. If the report persists post-deploy the cause is not policy drift; the discriminating SQL is tracked in the local stack's HANDOFF.
50 lines
2.4 KiB
SQL
50 lines
2.4 KiB
SQL
-- =============================================================================
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-- 025: Re-assert the hardened incidents_insert policy (production convergence)
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-- =============================================================================
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-- A basic, active member filing an incident report on production (including
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-- the anonymous path) hit:
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--
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-- new row violates row-level security policy for table "incidents"
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--
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-- Tracing the code against this repo, the insert SHOULD pass: fileIncident()
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-- sets reporter_id = NULL when anonymous (satisfying the second WITH CHECK
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-- branch) and space_id = the member's own space, and getAuthMember() resolves
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-- the member strictly by user_id = auth.uid() (so get_user_space_ids(auth.uid())
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-- contains that space_id). The failure is therefore a production divergence,
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-- not reproducible from source. The three candidate root causes are:
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--
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-- 1. auth.uid() is NULL inside the PostgREST request (SSR session/JWT not
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-- reaching the DB for this action).
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-- 2. The deployed incidents_insert policy differs from migrations 016/017
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-- (hand-edited, or an older variant the idempotent runner never replaced).
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-- 3. The acting space_members row's user_id does not match the JWT sub on
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-- production (data drift).
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--
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-- This migration addresses cause #2 only: it idempotently drops and recreates
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-- incidents_insert with the EXACT hardened expression from migration 017 and
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-- scripts/schema.sql. It is access-neutral (the policy text is identical to the
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-- intended state, so a correctly-deployed DB is unchanged) and it makes the
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-- deployed policy converge to the known-good definition.
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--
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-- It does NOT fix causes #1 or #3. If the report persists after this migration
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-- deploys, run the discriminating queries in docs/HANDOFF.md to confirm whether
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-- auth.uid() resolves and whether the member row's user_id matches.
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--
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-- Idempotent: DROP POLICY IF EXISTS then CREATE.
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-- =============================================================================
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DROP POLICY IF EXISTS incidents_insert ON public.incidents;
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CREATE POLICY incidents_insert ON public.incidents FOR INSERT
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WITH CHECK (
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space_id IN (SELECT public.get_user_space_ids(auth.uid()))
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AND (
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reporter_id IS NULL
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OR EXISTS (
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SELECT 1 FROM public.space_members m
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WHERE m.id = incidents.reporter_id
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AND m.user_id = auth.uid()
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AND m.space_id = incidents.space_id
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)
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)
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);
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