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T

Moheeb Zara 43f9c09d70 feat: landing redesign in resources aesthetic; fix KB search crash

Landing:
- Rebuilt app/(landing)/page.tsx from a 539-line client monolith to a
  ~150-line server component in the /resources editorial style.
- New scoped app/(landing)/landing.css mirrors the resources palette
  (#0c0c0c / lime #d4ff00 / #252525), IBM Plex Mono + Libre
  Baskerville loaded in (landing)/layout.tsx, faint grid overlay.
- Removed the animated Mini* previews and inline Ico* set (clashed
  with the editorial look). Split into components/landing/icons.tsx
  and components/landing/resource-showcase.tsx for separation.
- Resource showcase: one row of six square tiles with the real
  project SVG logos linking to atlas/space-after-dark/proposal-duel/
  zine/learner/governance. Responsive 6 -> 3 -> 2.
- BrandMark accepts an optional style prop.

Fix:
- KB search crashed the Ops page. filteredLeads referenced
  l.member_name (the column is lead_handle), so undefined.toLowerCase()
  threw on every keystroke since the filter memos recompute on shared
  search state across tabs. All Ops filter predicates are now
  null-safe via a shared has() helper; filteredSecrets no longer
  assumes a non-null title.

Docs:
- docs/PERMISSIONS_DESIGN.md: concrete plan for customizable
  permissions, per-item Ops ACLs, and area-lead roles. That work is
  security-sensitive (RLS rewrites on secrets/knowledge_base) and is
  scoped as its own next pass, not bundled here.

266/266 tests pass. Production build clean. No migration this pass.

2026-05-15 16:15:56 -07:00

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Permissions, Ops ACLs, and Area-Lead Roles — Design

Status: designed, not yet implemented. This is the plan for the next focused pass. It is security-sensitive (it rewrites RLS on secrets and knowledge_base), so it ships on its own, with its own tests, not bundled with unrelated UI work.

Goals (from the user)

Customizable permissions, not just role labels.
Per-secret access: choose which roles (multiple) can see each secret.
Same per-item access control across all Ops and Facilities content (knowledge base, processes, secrets, area leads).
Area-lead roles: an admin can create them. Each shows as "vacant" until a member is assigned, either from a dedicated picker or by clicking a member in the directory. Being the lead of an area grants the permissions attached wherever that area-lead role is referenced.

Model

Three layers, smallest blast radius first.

A. Permission catalog + role grants

permissions is a fixed code list in app code (not a table): e.g. ops.kb.read, ops.kb.write, ops.secrets.read, ops.secrets.write, members.manage, payments.manage, governance.manage, etc.
New table space_role_permissions (space_id, role_or_custom, permission) where role_or_custom is either a built-in member_role value or a space_custom_roles.slug. Admin always has all permissions implicitly (never lockable out — guard in code and RLS).
A SQL helper user_has_permission(uid, sid, perm text) returns boolean (SECURITY DEFINER, fixed search_path) used by RLS and a TS mirror hasPermission() used in server actions for early rejection + UI gating.

B. Per-item ACLs for Ops content

New table ops_acl (id, space_id, entity_type, entity_id, role text) where entity_type in ('secret','kb','process','area_lead') and role is a built-in role, a custom-role slug, or the sentinel area_lead:<area_code>.
An item with zero ACL rows falls back to its existing visibility column (knowledge_base.visibility, the board/admin default for secrets), so this is additive and backward compatible.
RLS SELECT on secrets / knowledge_base becomes: existing rule OR an EXISTS against ops_acl joined to the caller's effective roles (built-in role + assigned custom roles + area-lead memberships). Write stays admin/board (plus ops.*.write permission once layer A lands).

C. Area-lead roles

Reuse space_custom_roles with a flag is_area_lead boolean and an area_code link, OR add space_area_lead_roles (id, space_id, area_code, name, color). Prefer the dedicated table: it is the thing that renders "vacant".
area_lead_assignments (space_id, area_lead_role_id, member_id). Absence of a row => the role renders "Vacant". Assignment is created from a picker in /customize -> Areas or from a "Make area lead" action on a member row in the directory.
Effective-roles resolution (used by ops_acl SELECT and user_has_permission) treats a member who holds an area-lead assignment as also holding area_lead:<area_code>, so any Ops item whose ACL includes that sentinel becomes visible to them, and any permission granted to that area-lead role applies.

UI surfaces

/customize -> new "Permissions" panel: a role x permission matrix.
/customize -> Areas: per-area "Lead role" with a member picker; shows "Vacant" when unassigned.
/ops create/edit modals (KB, process, secret): a multi-select of roles + area-lead roles that may access this item.
/members: row action "Assign as area lead" -> area picker.

Migration plan

scripts/023_permissions.sql + schema.sql Section 15:

space_role_permissions, ops_acl, space_area_lead_roles, area_lead_assignments. All with full RLS (SELECT for space members, write for admin/board, delete admin).
Helper functions user_effective_roles(uid, sid) and user_has_permission(uid, sid, perm).
Rewrite secrets and knowledge_base SELECT policies to add the ACL branch. Keep the old branch so nothing that works today breaks.
Seed sensible default space_role_permissions per space (admin: all; board: ops + members + governance; treasurer: payments; member: kb.read).
Backfill: none required (empty ACL == current behavior).
Refresh types/database.ts, DB_SCHEMA_MAP.md, DATABASE_SCHEMA.md, API_REFERENCE.md.

Risks / why this is its own pass

RLS on secrets/knowledge_base is the highest-risk surface in the app. A wrong policy either leaks a credential cross-role or locks admins out. Needs dedicated RLS tests (the __tests__ governance/RLS pattern) before it goes near production.
Permission resolution must never let a member escalate themselves (the migration-015 trigger pattern). The user_has_permission helper must be SECURITY DEFINER with a pinned search_path, same as the existing helpers.
Ship behind the additive fallback so existing spaces are unaffected until an admin opts in by setting ACLs/permissions.

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