Add lib/tenant.ts as the single source of truth for multi- vs single-tenant
deployment. Gate space creation (server + signup UI), add open-join to the one
space, hide the marketing shell, and route brand name + base URL through config.
Also commit the _migrations_applied table into the canonical schema so a fresh
instance is reproducible from schema.sql alone.
- lib/tenant.ts: resolveTenantConfig (pure) + tenantConfig() + appBaseUrl()
- lib/auth-actions.ts: createSpace refused when !allowSpaceCreation; joinSpace
open-join resolves the configured/sole space with no invite code
- proxy.ts: marketing paths redirect to /login when showMarketing is off
- app/signup/page.tsx: single-tenant hides create/join chooser, brand=siteName
- app/layout.tsx + 4 link builders: brand/base-URL via config (no hackerspace.sh literal)
- scripts/schema.sql: public._migrations_applied tracking table
- .env.example: documented single-tenant + first-admin bootstrap vars
- package.json: pnpm setup
The new /docs section is static, public help content, but proxy.ts (the auth
middleware) redirects any non-allowlisted path to /login, so unauthenticated
visitors were bounced off /docs to the login page. Add /docs to PUBLIC_ROUTES
(covers /docs and every /docs/<category>/<slug>); screenshots under /docs-media
already bypass the middleware via the image matcher.
Verified locally with no session: /docs and doc pages return 200, while
/dashboard and /members still redirect to /login.
The installed supabase-js (2.99, 5 generics) is incompatible with
@supabase/[email protected] (calls it with 3), collapsing the server client's
schema to `never` — the root cause of ~450 of the 586 hidden type errors
(next.config typescript.ignoreBuildErrors masks them all).
- lib/supabase/server.ts: annotate the factory as SupabaseClient<Database>
and bridge the ssr/js impedance mismatch at the one documented boundary;
type the setAll cookie params.
- lib/supabase/proxy.ts, proxy.ts: type the setAll cookie params.
- lib/auth-helpers.ts: parseInput now infers its result from the schema via
z.infer (was a fragile ZodSchema<T> that widened outputs to {}).
- lib/validations.ts: annotate flexibleDateTime's output type.
- types/database.ts: add class_signup_tx / class_cancel_tx RPC signatures
(called but absent; pending full regeneration).
- tsconfig.json: target ES2020 (door-log-logic uses BigInt literals).
- vitest.setup.ts: import beforeAll/afterAll instead of relying on globals.
No runtime behavior change; 639 tests still green. ignoreBuildErrors stays
on until the remaining errors reach zero.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Phase 4 (migration 053): pull entry/denied events into door_access_log and
match each card to a member, via two transports sharing one ingest core.
Poll: a CRON_SECRET-guarded /api/cron/door-ingest reads each opted-in
native-HeatSync connection's ?z log through the existing hardened executor
and parses it (firmware-characterized, best-effort ring buffer). Webhook:
/api/door/inbound/[connection] accepts pushed event JSON authenticated by a
per-connection bearer secret from the vault. Both dedupe on
(connection_id, dedupe_key) so re-polls and retries are no-ops. Adds an
inbound config panel to /door/manage.
Phase 5 (migration 054): admins define api_buttons that fire a configured
HTTP call (full verbs + headers + body) when an authorized member presses
them, through the same hardened egress (now shared between callDoor and the
new callApi). Each button carries a required_permission (default the new
apicall.invoke code); members see only buttons they may press. Builder at
/door/buttons with a door-template preset; members press from /doors. Every
press is recorded in api_call_log with secrets redacted.
Both subsystems are inert until an admin enables inbound on a connection or
creates a button. 624 unit + 50 integration tests; migrations applied
top-to-bottom in schema.sql; types and docs updated.
/auth -> /auth/callback and /api/cron -> /api/cron/notifications.
Both prefixes whitelisted more than the single route that needs
anonymity; a future /auth/* page or /api/cron/* job would have been
silently public. Verified those are the only routes under each.
POST /api/cron/notifications drains <=20 pending rows/min, sends via the
transport with the row id as Resend Idempotency-Key (overlap-safe),
marks sent or increments attempts (retryable -> stay pending, permanent
or budget-exhausted -> failed). Constant-time CRON_SECRET bearer check;
503 when unset. ~4.5/s spacing under Resend's 5/s limit. proxy.ts
whitelists /api/cron (no session; own shared secret). CRON_SECRET added
to .env.example.
proxy.ts auth-gates every non-public path and 307-redirects to /login.
The Stripe webhook is called without a session, so it was being
redirected; Stripe does not follow redirects, so every webhook delivery
would have failed. Add /api/stripe/webhook to PUBLIC_ROUTES (scoped to
the webhook path only) and correct the route/header comments that wrongly
claimed there was no auth middleware. Caught by smoke-testing the
deployed route (POST returned 307 instead of 400).
Gap: fileIncident minted a reporter_token and the filing UI showed it
("the only way to look it up later") but there was no lookup UI.
- lib/incident-logic.ts (pure, tested): publicIncidentView redacts —
board_only updates, subjects, decision-maker ids dropped; disposition
only surfaced once decided/closed; status label mapping
- trackIncident: public service-client action (token is a 192-bit
bearer credential on a UNIQUE column; anon has no RLS path so the
service client is used AFTER token validation; generic not-found is
enumeration-safe; board_only filtered at the query AND in logic)
- public /track page + client (also accepts ?token= deep link);
/track added to middleware PUBLIC_ROUTES
- filing UI now deep-links /track?token=<code>
- trackIncidentSchema; __tests__/incident-tracking.test.ts (6)
- docs: API_REFERENCE + HANDOFF pass-20 (session arc, web-verified
integration facts, locked forward roadmap, open items incl. the
still-open production incident-INSERT RLS bug)
343 tests; build verified (Compiled successfully, exit 0).
Invites
- migration 029: space_invites.role (member_role enum, default
'member' — legacy invites and the spaces.invite_code path keep
granting member). schema.sql + types/database.ts mirrored
- lib/invite-logic.ts (pure, tested): canAssignInviteRole — admin may
grant any role; board may grant anything except admin; nobody else.
Privilege-escalation guard on top of the existing admin/board gate
- createInvite/updateInvite take + enforce role via that guard;
createInviteSchema/updateInviteSchema validate the enum
- joinSpace applies the invite's granted role (validated), default
member; uses_count/max_uses/expiry already enforced
- invites panel: role picker (filtered to what the creator may grant),
one-click "single use", per-invite role badge
- space-scoped invite link /join/<space>?code=… via a presentational
app/join/[space] landing that hands off to the proven
/signup?invite= flow; /join added to middleware PUBLIC_ROUTES
Audit hardening (from this pass's review)
- /login now honors a validated same-origin ?next= (was hardcoded to
/dashboard) so the public_auth form sign-in round-trips; OAuth
threads next through the callback (which already honored it)
- submitForm requires formId; submitFormSchema drops the now-ambiguous
slug path (form slugs are per-space after 028). Both callers already
pass formId. Tests updated
337 tests; build verified (Compiled successfully, exit 0). No deploy.
The middleware PUBLIC_ROUTES allowlist did not include the public
form/waiver fill route, so unauthenticated visitors hitting
/f/<slug> were redirected to /login — making the entire public/
anonymous forms feature unreachable in production. Add '/f' to the
allowlist; only /f/[slug] lives under it (the /forms* management
routes do not match the '/f/' prefix and stay auth-gated). The page
already serves only published public forms and submitForm enforces
visibility, so this exposes nothing new.
Ports the existing hackerspace.sh Vue site (sibling repo) into this
codebase as a route group `app/(resources)/` so a single domain serves
both the public research / games subsite and the authenticated
management app.
Routes added (all public, all prerendered):
/resources landing page (the original HomePage.vue)
/zine iframe to the printable hackerspace zine
/governance iframe to Governance in a Box
/space-after-dark iframe to the isometric exploration game
/proposal-duel iframe to the proposal-debate game
/atlas iframe to the bundled atlas.html (2.2 MB)
The individual resource paths match the originals exactly so existing
deep links and bookmarks survive the domain switch-over.
Ports six Vue components to React: Wordmark, SpaceIcon, TraceIcon,
CubeIcon, KeyIcon, GridIcon, PromptIcon, AtlasLogo, ProjectCard,
IframeWrapper. CSS scoped under `.resources-root` so the dark IBM Plex
Mono / Libre Baskerville theme cannot bleed into the management app's
shadcn design system. Fonts loaded via next/font/google. The 2.2 MB
atlas.html lives in /public.
proxy.ts adds the six routes plus /atlas.html to PUBLIC_ROUTES so
anonymous visitors can reach them without redirecting to /login.
The management landing page links to /resources twice: a "Resources"
nav link, and a callout under the CTA buttons ("Not running a space?
Read the hackerspace research and games").
Adds proposals + proposal_votes + policies + incidents + incident_updates
tables with full RLS, async voting flow, dismissal-appeal pathway,
versioned policies with provenance, and an anonymous-incident token mode.
Adds per-space configurable areas, financial visibility settings, member
self-profile + COI disclosure, and a mission statement that renders in
the app footer.
Reorganises lib/actions.ts into per-domain files (tasks, projects,
members, payments, contacts, knowledge-base, secrets, area-leads,
settings, imports, proposals, incidents, policies, areas) plus a barrel.
Adds lib/permissions.ts and lib/auth-helpers.ts so action bodies stop
duplicating the user-to-member-to-role check. Wires every action that has
a Zod schema; introduces a flexibleDateTime preprocessor so HTML date
pickers no longer hit "Invalid datetime".
Hardens RLS: drops NOT NULL on space_members.user_id for offline members,
adds a privilege-escalation trigger that blocks self-edits to role / tier
/ status / approved / has_card_access / space_id, closes four
cross-tenant holes in the governance kernel, and adds a partial unique
index so two admins cannot concurrently activate two drafts of the same
policy slug.
Ships every deployment artifact: Dockerfile, docker-compose,
.do/app.yaml, .env.example, /api/health, plus a managed-Supabase guide
(docs/DEPLOYMENT.md), an end-to-end self-hosted Droplet guide
(docs/DEPLOY_DO_SELFHOSTED.md), and a Supabase-CLI local-dev quickstart
(docs/LOCAL_DEV.md). Replaces middleware.ts with proxy.ts for Next.js 16.
Adds scripts/schema.sql as the canonical idempotent full deploy plus
fourteen numbered incremental migrations.
Adds scripts/seed.sql so a fresh local DB renders something instead of
empty pages: a demo space, five members across all roles, a v1 code of
conduct, three proposals in different states with seven votes already
cast, an open incident, a project, three tasks, a KB entry, and matching
activity-log rows.
Replaces v0-generated test scaffolding with 266 real tests across
__tests__/{actions,auth-helpers,components,governance,permissions,
security,utils,validations}.test.ts. Adds react-markdown + remark-gfm
for proposal / incident / policy body rendering. Deletes four dead v0
fix-* scripts, the unused components/app-shell.tsx, and the duplicate
app/auth/login/page.tsx.
Routes (31 total): /api/health, /api/paypal/sync, /auth/callback, /,
/login, /signup, /signup/confirm, /dashboard, /tasks, /projects,
/members, /payments, /financials, /contacts, /ops, /ops/[id], /ops/new,
/proposals, /proposals/[id], /proposals/new, /incidents, /incidents/[id],
/incidents/new, /policies, /policies/[slug], /policies/new, /profile,
/recruitment, /settings, /comms, /import.
Full pass-by-pass history is in docs/HANDOFF.md; the roadmap is in
docs/GOVERNANCE_FEATURES.md.
Moheeb Zara
