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feat(door): P3-C live grant/revoke/open-lock-unlock actions

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door.operate, rate-limited, every attempt writes one redacted
door_access_log row. Operators have no RLS read on door_connections/
member_cards so reads use the service client after the permission check,
space-scoped. grantCard reserves the slot in the DB first (unique
constraints arbitrate concurrency), calls the controller, rolls the
reservation back on failure; idempotent re-grant; slot_exhausted when
full. revokeCard idempotent; frees the slot only on confirmed controller
success so the app map never diverges from the device. doorControl
open/unlock/lock via the single hardened executor. API_REFERENCE.
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Moheeb Zara
2026-05-16 21:09:59 -07:00
parent a5e1ed985c
commit e5cedb62e5
3 changed files with 361 additions and 2 deletions
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docs/API_REFERENCE.md
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@@ -929,6 +929,8 @@ Registry management is gated by `equipment.manage`; reserving needs only members
- `listEquipmentReservations(input)` — `equipment.manage`; reservations for one item (joined member) for the schedule view.
- `getMyReservations()` — the signed-in member's own reservations (joined equipment). No params; RLS restricts to own rows (the `/me` view).
### Door epic: `member-cards.ts` (migration 034) + `door.ts` (migration 035)
### Door epic: `member-cards.ts` (migration 034) + `door.ts` (migrations 035-036)
Card UID is a credential. `member-cards.ts`: `addMemberCard`/`updateMemberCard`/`deleteMemberCard`/`listMemberCards` are `door.manage` (full UID); `getMyCards()` is the member's own MASKED view (service client, returns only count + last4, never the raw UID — `member_cards` has no member RLS SELECT).
`door.ts` (all `door.manage` except the read log): `createDoorConnection`/`updateDoorConnection`/`deleteDoorConnection`/`listDoorConnections`; `listSecretTitles()` (titles only, to pick a vault secret for the password). `testDoorConnection(input)` runs only the `status` verb through the hardened executor and writes one redacted audit row. `listDoorAccessLog()` is `door.manage` OR `door.operate`. Security model: the shared password is read from the AES-256-GCM secrets vault server-side and embedded in the request per the verified firmware (auth is a query param); `lib/door/executor.ts` is the single egress — it enforces `validateDoorTarget` (request host must equal the connection's pinned host; metadata/link-local always blocked; http(s) only), refuses redirects, caps time/body, and `redactDoorSecrets` scrubs the password before anything is logged. Native HeatSync verbs are encoded with the verified fixed-width zero-padding (slot 3 / perm 3 / tag 8 / `&e=` password); generic connections use admin `{slot}/{tag}/{pw}` templates. Live grant/revoke/open and the per-connection member self-entry are phase 3.
`door.ts` (all `door.manage` except the read log): `createDoorConnection`/`updateDoorConnection`/`deleteDoorConnection`/`listDoorConnections`; `listSecretTitles()` (titles only, to pick a vault secret for the password). `testDoorConnection(input)` runs only the `status` verb through the hardened executor and writes one redacted audit row. `listDoorAccessLog()` is `door.manage` OR `door.operate`. Security model: the shared password is read from the AES-256-GCM secrets vault server-side and embedded in the request per the verified firmware (auth is a query param); `lib/door/executor.ts` is the single egress — it enforces `validateDoorTarget` (request host must equal the connection's pinned host; metadata/link-local always blocked; http(s) only), refuses redirects, caps time/body, and `redactDoorSecrets` scrubs the password before anything is logged. Native HeatSync verbs are encoded with the verified fixed-width zero-padding (slot 3 / perm 3 / tag 8 / `&e=` password); generic connections use admin `{slot}/{tag}/{pw}` templates.
Phase 3 live actions (all `door.operate`, rate-limited, every attempt writes one redacted `door_access_log` row, service client after the permission check since operators have no RLS read on `door_connections`/`member_cards`): `grantCard({connectionId, cardId, permissionMask?})` allocates the card's per-connection integer slot via the pure lowest-free allocator (`door_card_slots`; idempotent re-grant, `slot_exhausted` when full), reserves it in the DB first, calls the controller, and rolls the reservation back if the call fails. `revokeCard({connectionId, cardId})` is idempotent (no slot assigned means already revoked) and frees the slot only on confirmed controller success so the app's map never diverges from the device. `doorControl({connectionId, verb})` with `verb` of `open`/`unlock`/`lock` (HeatSync `open` is a momentary `o1`; generic controllers need the matching verb template) touches no slot. The per-connection member self-entry action is the next, separately reviewed step.