feat: customizable permissions, per-item Ops ACLs, area-lead roles

Migration 023 (folded into schema.sql section 15). ADDITIVE and
backward compatible: with no permission/ACL rows the app behaves
exactly as before.

Schema:
- space_role_permissions (space_id, subject, permission); ops_acl
  (space_id, entity_type secret|kb|process|area_lead, entity_id,
  role). Full RLS, writes admin/board.
- user_effective_roles(uid,sid): built-in role + custom-role slugs +
  area_lead:<id> for areas the member leads. SECURITY DEFINER.
- user_has_permission(uid,sid,perm): admin implicit-all else a grant
  via an effective role. SECURITY DEFINER.
- secrets/knowledge_base SELECT rewritten as
  `exact existing rule OR ops_acl match` (only widens; zero change
  with no ACL rows). Seed + backfill default role permissions.

Area-lead roles reuse the existing area_leads table rather than
duplicating the concept: a row is a role, lead_id NULL = Vacant,
assigning sets lead_id, the member then holds area_lead:<id>.

App:
- lib/permissions-catalog.ts (codes + per-role defaults + guardrails),
  Zod schemas, lib/actions/permissions.ts (setRolePermissions,
  setOpsAcl, createAreaLeadRole, assign/unassign/delete).
- Customize gains Permissions (role x permission matrix, admin shown
  implicit-all/locked) and Area leads (create/Vacant/assign) panels,
  modular under customize/panels/. Reusable
  components/ops/ops-acl-editor.tsx wired into the Secrets list.

Audit-found latent fixes:
- revealSecret errors on encrypted-but-no-ciphertext corruption
  instead of silently returning the stale plaintext column.
- upsertAreaLead rejects null/empty area_code (NULLs are distinct in
  unique constraints; allowed duplicate rows).

types/database.ts: added the two new tables. 271/271 tests pass,
build clean. KB-modal ACL wiring + members-row shortcut deferred and
tracked in HANDOFF.

lib/actions/secrets.ts

@@ -124,6 +124,14 @@ export async function revealSecret(secretId: string) {
 
   if (error || !data) return { error: error?.message ?? 'Not found' }
 
+  // A row marked encrypted (version > 0) MUST have ciphertext. If it does
+  // not, the row is corrupt: do not silently fall back to the (empty/stale)
+  // plaintext column, which would either leak nothing useful or mask data
+  // loss. Surface it instead.
+  if ((data.encryption_version ?? 0) > 0 && !data.encrypted_value) {
+    return { error: 'This secret is marked encrypted but has no ciphertext. It may be corrupted; re-enter it.' }
+  }
+
   let plaintext: string
   try {
     if (data.encryption_version === 1 && data.encrypted_value) {